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“The history of no other European people has been so decisively 
modified by a frontier as Castile, for century after century”  
–Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz, in Burns (1989, p. 325). 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper shows that the legacy of history is particularly pervasive in Spain. We provide 
evidence to show that a historical process that ended more than five centuries ago, the 
Reconquest, is very important to explain Spanish regional economic development. The so-
called Reconquista is a milestone in Spanish history. For a period of almost eight hundred 
years that started in 711 with the invasion of the Iberian Peninsula by the Muslims, what is 
now mainland Spain experienced a process fairly akin to colonialism. Throughout this long 
period, and after an initial phase of mere resistance, the Christians located in the North 
gradually reconquered the Muslim lands and implemented measures to colonize the 
reclaimed territory. We argue that the rate or speed of the Reconquest, that is, whether the 
Christian frontier advanced rapidly or not, was a crucial factor affecting the type of 
colonization conducted in each territory and its corresponding initial political equilibrium. A 
fast rate of Reconquest is associated with imperfect colonization, characterized by an 
oligarchic political equilibrium, thus creating the conditions for an inegalitarian society with 
negative consequences for long-term economic development. 
This paper is framed within a new stream of literature dealing with the long-term effects of 
frontier expansions. In a recent contribution, García-Jimeno and Robinson (2011) have 
proposed the “conditional frontier hypothesis” to explain the starkly contrasting outcomes 
derived from the frontier experiences in North America (Turner, 1920) and Latin America 
(Hennessy, 1978). According to this hypothesis, the consequences of the frontier depend on 
the initial political equilibrium existing in society at the time of the territorial expansion. In 
North America, where the prevailing social climate was relatively democratic and 
egalitarian, the frontier brought about individualism, self-government and aversion to social 
stratification, whereas in the more oligarchic societies of South America, the presence of a 
frontier reinforced economic and political inequality. Focusing on the historical border 
between Castile and the Nasrid Kingdom of Granada in southern Spain, Oto-Peralías and 
Romero-Ávila (2016) suggest that military insecurity is a factor that favors a political 
equilibrium biased toward the military elite in frontier regions, generating highly persistent 
differences in inequality. 
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This article introduces and tests the hypothesis that the political equilibrium among the 
colonizing agents may be endogenous to the scale of frontier expansion. This is because 
large territorial expansion allows the elite to play a dominant role in the process of 
colonizing the conquered lands. Applied to our case study, this became evident after the 
collapse of the Almohad Caliphate in 1212 following the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa, 
which enabled the Christian armies to conquer vast swathes of territory in a short period of 
time. The outcome involved large frontier regions dominated by military orders and the 
nobility, with negative consequences for long-term development. In contrast, a slow frontier 
expansion was associated with a more balanced occupation of the territory and a more 
egalitarian social structure. This was so because smaller frontier regions favored the 
participation of individual settlers and the Crown in the repopulation, which would lead to 
better political institutions and a more equitable distribution of the land – as happened in the 
colonization of the Duero Valley, where settlers occupied land and obtained its ownership. 
As argued below, these initial differences in the patterns of distribution of economic and 
political power persisted over time, and led to divergent development paths across what are 
now the Spanish provinces.  
In the empirical part of the paper, we create an indicator measuring the “rate of 
Reconquest”, which captures whether the Christian military conquests progressed rapidly or 
slowly when each province was reclaimed. We show that there is a robustly negative 
relationship between the rate of Reconquest and current per capita income across today’s 
Spanish provinces. This relationship does not simply reflect the fact that regions in the 
South are poorer, since the results survive the inclusion of latitude and many other 
geographic, topographic and climatic controls. The effect remains statistically significant 
when the regression analysis is extended to the level of municipality, even after controlling 
for province fixed effects. The results are not driven by a selection problem informed by the 
possibility that –for instance– the Christian kingdoms chose to conquer faster economically 
less attractive territories. A number of falsification tests show that there is no link between 
the rate of Reconquest and several indicators of pre-Reconquest economic development. 
We also analyze the channels through which the rate of Reconquest has affected current 
income. The results suggest that structural inequality, caused by a high concentration of land 
and political power in the hands of the nobility, played a central role as intervening variable. 
This is consistent with the hypothesis formulated by Engerman and Sokoloff (2000, 2002) 
and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson –AJR– (2002), whereby a high concentration of 
economic and political power in a few hands has impaired modern economic growth 
because it precludes large segments of the population from participating in economic 
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activity when the opportunity to industrialize arrived. The timing of the effect of the 
Reconquest is consistent with this hypothesis, since its negative effect became most 
apparent during the industrialization period. This interpretation is also congruent with the 
fact that at the onset of industrialization in Spain (around 1860) the negative impact of the 
rate of Reconquest was also present in some of the foundations of modern economic growth, 
such as human capital. A general conclusion of our analysis is that accelerated (and 
imperfect) colonization may create the conditions for an inegalitarian society, with negative 
consequences for long-term economic development. 
Several other papers are to some extent related to ours. Chaney (2008) and Chaney and 
Hornbeck (2015) investigate the expulsion of about 120,000 Moriscos in 1609 from the 
Kingdom of Valencia. Chaney (2008) finds that persistent extractive institutional 
arrangements in former Morisco areas inhibited the development of the non-agricultural 
sector long after the adverse population shock. Chaney and Hornbeck (2015) provide 
evidence of Malthusian dynamics in early modern Spain by documenting persistent rises in 
output per capita as a result of the population decline caused by the expulsion. Tur-Prats 
(2015) finds that a historically-determined persistent geographical distribution of traditional 
family types (stem vs. nuclear) affects intimate-partner violence (IPV). Based on a historical 
account, she uses the stages of the Reconquest and a freedom of testation indicator as 
instruments for the different family types. Droller (2013) investigates the effect of migration 
and population composition on long-run economic development in the settlement of the 
Argentina’s frontier regions known as the Pampas. The channels through which historically 
higher shares of European population affects current output are associated with 
industrialization and the level of human capital measured through literacy rates. 
This paper also contributes in several ways to a growing body of research that considers 
economic development as a long-term process with deep historical roots (Spolaore and 
Wacziarg 2013; Nunn 2014).1 First, our case study is appealing in the sense that the 
historical process studied in this article is very remote in time. The Reconquest ended in 
1492 with the fall of Granada yet, significantly, its effects remain visible today. Explaining 
the reasons for the effect of the Reconquest being so persistent, along with the channels 
through which it took place, are questions of general interest. Second, our work is also 
                                                 
1 Examples of this vibrant literature are Engerman and Sokoloff (2000, 2002), AJR (2001, 2002), Bockstette, 
Chanda, and Putterman (2002), Banerjee and Iyer (2005), Angeles (2007), Gennaioli and Rainer (2007), 
Acemoglu et al. (2008), Baten and van Zanden (2008), Feyrer and Sacerdote (2009), Becker and Woessmann 
(2009), Iyer (2010), Dell (2010), Gallego (2010), Acemoglu et al. (2011), Bruhn and Gallego (2012), Easterly 
and Levine (2003, 2016), Ashraf and Galor (2013), Chaney (2013), Cook (2014), Fenske (2013, 2014), Alsan 
(2015), and Hansen et al. (2015). 
5 
interesting because unlike most previous studies focusing on former colonies, it analyzes the 
experience of a developed economy that became a leading colonial power in the 
Mercantilist era of colonialism. Third, a particularity of the Spanish case is that over a long 
period of time its territory experienced a process very similar to colonialism. Thus, an 
analysis of the Spanish Reconquest is useful because it gives clues about the subsequent 
colonization of the New World. When Spain colonized Central and South America in the 
sixteenth century, it had all the experience gathered in the Reconquest and through the 
policies implemented in the occupation of Muslim lands. Therefore, while the recent 
literature has emphasized that Spanish colonial policies were significantly influenced by the 
preexisting indigenous organization in conquered areas (Engerman and Sokoloff 2002; 
Frankema 2010), it should not be ignored that the granting of large tracts of land to the 
nobility, for example, had a clear precedent in the homeland.2  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief historical 
overview. Section 3 describes the indicator for the rate of Reconquest and the other 
variables used in the paper. Section 4 presents the analysis of the effect the Reconquest has 
had on current economic development, while Section 5 provides several sensitivity 
exercises that include a municipality-level analysis. Section 6 analyzes the timing of the 
effect of the Reconquest, and Section 7 investigates the possible channels through which 
this effect occurs. Finally, Section 8 puts forward some implications, and concludes. 
2. Historical Background3 
An interesting feature of Spanish history is that for a period of almost eight hundred years 
the Iberian Peninsula experienced a process somewhat akin to colonialism. In 711, what is 
now the Spanish mainland was invaded by the Muslims, who in a very short period of time 
occupied almost the whole of the Iberian Peninsula and created a Muslim domain that was 
known as al-Andalus. This western European Muslim territory achieved great economic and 
cultural development, and for most of the period under Moorish rule it was the most 
advanced country on the continent (Chejne 1999). With the passage of time, the Christian 
outposts located in northern Spain gradually conquered the Muslim territory in a process 
                                                 
2 In the territories of the southern plateau and Andalusia, the Crown granted large estates (or encomiendas) to 
the military orders and the nobility (Brenan 1943). “An encomienda was an estate given by the King in 
señorío, or with full manorial rights, for one lifetime or for some determinate period only. The Comendador 
was the title of the temporary possessor, who enjoyed all or most of the rights of the King. After the twelfth 
century encomiendas died out except in the military orders, in which they were the recognized form of land 
tenure” (Brenan 1943, p. 113). 
3 This historical overview draws on Sánchez Albornoz (1932), Brenan (1943), Dominguez-Ortiz (1955), Herr 
(1958), Vicens Vives (1969), Malefakis (1970), Sobrequés (1972), Carrión (1975), Ruiz-Maya (1979), Glick 
(1979), Mestre-Campi and Sabaté (1998), and García-Ormaechea (2002). 
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that lasted until 1492, with the fall of the Nasrid Kingdom of Granada. This long period of 
Christian conquest is known as the Reconquista. Military campaigns were followed by a 
process of colonization or repopulation of the new lands. The way in which the colonization 
was conducted had fundamental consequences for each region’s ensuing development.4 
The crucial outcomes of the repopulation process were how land was distributed and who 
held political power. Other potential aspects of relevance were the resulting level of 
population density, the degree of integration of the Muslim population, and the extent to 
which preexisting technologies were preserved. An important factor that decisively affected 
the outcome of the repopulation was the speed of the Christian conquests; that is, whether 
the Christian frontier advanced rapidly or slowly (Sobrequés 1972; Malefakis 1970). We 
call this factor “rate of Reconquest”. A slow process in this case is generally associated with 
a more complete and balanced repopulation. This is because a smaller area to be colonized 
favored the participation of individual settlers and the Crown in the repopulation, which led 
to better political institutions and a more egalitarian distribution of land. By contrast, a rapid 
process is associated with imperfect colonization (González Jiménez, 2006). In this case, a 
larger area to be repopulated implied fewer resources were available relative to the 
magnitude of the task; that is, an insufficient number of settlers, as well as administrative 
and military difficulties to govern and defend the territory. This favored the participation of 
the nobility and military orders in the organization and defense of the new lands.  
Figure 1 shows how the rate of Reconquest differs markedly across the different stages of 
this historical process. During the first three and half centuries of the Reconquest (from 711 
to 1062) the Christian kingdoms conquered about 155,000 km2, while over the next two 
centuries (until 1266) the reconquered area almost doubled (about 287,000 km2). Thus, the 
rate of Reconquest (i.e., the area reconquered divided by the duration in years of that period) 
was much slower in the first period (approx. 441 km2/year) than in the second period 
(approx. 1407 km2/year). These differences had profound consequences for the type of 
colonization conducted in each case. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
A slow rate of Reconquest implied that individual settlers with few economic resources 
could colonize the territory by themselves. This was the case of the repopulation of the 
Duero Valley, where the distinctive feature of this process was the predominance of private 
initiative; that is, a type of repopulation conducted by individuals who occupied land and 
                                                 
4 Spanish historiography labels repopulation as the process of colonization of the reconquered lands by the 
Christian kingdoms. In this paper, we use the terms colonization and repopulation indistinctly to refer to this 
process. 
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acquired its property through the institution of presura or aprisio (i.e., apprehension of 
land). In general, this repopulation implied a more balanced occupation of the land, as 
reflected in the presence of a large number of small settlements that appear evenly 
distributed across the repopulated territory. It also led to the creation of a society with a 
democratic structure of free peasants with access to land (Vicens Vives 1969).5 The Crown 
also found it easier to organize the repopulation when the area to be occupied was not large. 
Thus, in the lands comprised between the rivers Duero and Tagus the repopulation was to a 
large extent officially organized and conducted by the King through the creation of 
municipalities or councils (repoblación concejil), which delimited and distributed 
smallholdings among settlers (Ruiz-Maya 1979). When the repopulation was conducted by 
the Crown, the result was still beneficial to the peasantry, since land was relatively well 
distributed and cities remained under royal jurisdiction.6 
In addition, a smaller area to be repopulated (consequence of a slow rate of Reconquest) 
favored the preservation of Muslim agricultural technologies and the integration of the 
Muslim population. Indeed, the repopulation in Aragon was different than in Castile, largely 
due to the smaller area this kingdom reconquered. In this case, the King was able to 
carefully organize the colonization, and the nobility played a smaller role (Sobrequés 1972). 
In contrast to Castile, the repopulation of Aragon had such particularities as a higher 
concern for maintaining irrigation structures, greater respect for the Muslim population, and 
less reward for the aristocracy for their participation in the conquest and defense of new 
territories (Casado-Alonso 2002; Vicens Vives 1969). 
The above contrasts with the situation in the stages of the Reconquest comprised between 
1062 and 1266, particularly in Castile, where the Christian conquests progressed much more 
rapidly. The larger frontier areas to be repopulated rendered it unfeasible to colonize 
through individual settlers. Likewise, it was also difficult for the King to be able to organize 
the repopulation on such a large scale. In this context, the Crown found in the military 
orders and the nobility the most “effective means of [occupation and] defense in the border 
region” (Forey 1984, p. 214),7 with the latter groups being granted large estates and 
                                                 
5 The northern and mountainous territories that did not fall under Muslim control were characterized by the 
existence of few large estates, as well as by a social structure composed of a majority of free men and little 
class differentiation (Glick 1979). 
6 Under royal jurisdiction, the peasantry faced a smaller tax burden than under noble jurisdiction, where 
seigneurial duties were added to state taxes (García-Ormaechea 2002). 
7 Following the example of the Holy Land crusaders, the Castilians created three great military orders that 
served as armies for the kingdom to conquer Muslim lands and defend the Christian frontier. The order of 
Calatrava was founded in 1158, the order of Santiago in 1170, and the order of Alcántara in 1176, all during 
the second half of the twelfth century, a period from which military orders grew in importance due to their key 
role in the defense of the frontier (González Jiménez 1989). 
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jurisdictional rights. This situation was intensified after the Muslim defeat at the Battle of 
Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212. In a short period of time (between 1225 and 1250), most of 
the southern third of the peninsula suddenly fell into Christian hands (Malefakis 1970). By 
the mid-thirteenth century, the Reconquest was almost complete, with the exception being 
the Nasrid Kingdom of Granada.  
The magnitude of the frontier expansion profoundly affected the subsequent social 
reorganization (Sobrequés 1972; Malefakis 1970). “[G]iven the weak resources of the 
period, the Castilians had to deploy enormous effort in order to cater for the administration, 
defense, and economic development of these southern lands [...] Inevitably, the disparity 
between the magnitude of the task and the precarious resources available produced 
problems. One of these was the birth of the great landed estates” (Cabrera Muñoz, 1989, p. 
465); another was the concentration of political power in the hands of the nobility. It is thus 
no surprise that the concentration of landownership and the proportion of territory under the 
jurisdiction of nobles or military orders were the highest in the regions of Castile-La 
Mancha, Extremadura and Andalusia.8 In addition, a rapid rate of Reconquest made it 
difficult to govern the Muslim population and preserve their agricultural technologies. Thus, 
the previously intensive agriculture of the Guadalquivir Valley dramatically changed after 
the expulsion of the Moors from Andalusia following the 1264 revolt, being replaced by an 
extensive agrarian sector dominated by olive groves and sheep (Vicens Vives 1969; 
Malefakis 1970). 
The existence of a link between the rate of Reconquest and the type of colonization is 
clearly reflected in the pattern of settlements in Spain. A rapid rate of Reconquest means a 
scarcity of settlers and economic resources, which gives rise to an unbalanced occupation of 
the territory consisting of an urban structure of a disperse distribution of few settlements 
involving large jurisdictional areas. In this sense, López-González et al. (1989) have argued 
that the size of municipal areas tends to increase as the Reconquest progressed, with the 
largest being on the Castilian side of Andalusia. There is indeed a very positive relationship 
between the rate of Reconquest and municipal surface area (measured both in 1787 and 
2011). Remarkably, the rate of Reconquest alone explains 61% of the variation in municipal 
area in 1787.9 This provides additional support for the fact that the scale of the frontier 
                                                 
8 Regarding the possibility that the concentration of land in Andalusia after the Reconquest merely reflected 
the situation under Muslim domination, Malefakis (1970) states that it is indisputable that land concentration 
in Moorish times was lower than under Castilian domination.  
9 The positive effect of rate of Reconquest on municipality size is robust to controlling for geographic 
variables such as soil quality, altitude and distance to the coast. As a falsification test, we also show that rate of 
Reconquest is not significantly related to the average size of ancient (pre-medieval) settlements. Due to space 
considerations, detailed results are available in (Supplementary) Appendix A. 
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expansion affected the pattern of colonization of the conquered lands in a manner that is 
consistent with our line of argumentation. 
To sum up, the rate of Reconquest conditioned the type of colonization conducted in each 
region. A rapid rate favored a political equilibrium biased toward the nobility, creating 
societies with high levels of economic and political inequality –with other potential 
consequences being a low integration of the Muslim population and scant preservation of 
their technologies. In contrast, a slow rate of Reconquest led to a more balanced occupation 
of the territory and a more egalitarian social structure. We argue that initial differences in 
the type of repopulation created different development paths across today’s Spanish 
provinces, with implications for their current level of prosperity. Thus, we expect a negative 
relationship between the rate of Reconquest and current per capita income. After presenting 
the data used in the paper, the following sections test this prediction and provide evidence 
on the timing of the effect and the mechanisms at work. 
3. Rate of Reconquest and Other Data 
We construct a database for the 50 Spanish provinces that contains variables concerning 
the rate of Reconquest, current economic development, and many historical and geographic 
controls. Our main indicator for measuring the conditions and pace at which the Reconquest 
was made is labeled “rate of Reconquest”. It measures the total area of the stage of the 
Reconquest in which the province was conquered by Christians, divided by the duration in 
years of that stage of the Reconquest. Therefore, the rate of Reconquest is a ratio of the 
amount of reconquered area divided by an interval of years. Intuitively, it reflects the speed 
at which the Christian frontier advanced and, consequently, the level of colonization effort 
required for the effective occupation of the province.  
We construct this variable as follows. First, using geospatial software we calculate the 
surface area of each stage of the Reconquest from detailed maps provided by Mestre-Campi 
and Sabaté (1998). In this first step, we differentiate between the areas conquered by the 
Kingdom of Castile and the Crown of Aragon. In what follows, for the sake of simplicity, 
we refer to these 16 Reconquest areas (9 for Castile and 7 for Aragon) as Reconquest stages. 
Regarding the initial area of resistance in northern Spain, since it was not effectively 
conquered by the Muslims and, therefore, not reconquered, we exclude it from the baseline 
analysis.10 Second, we calculate the duration in years of each stage of the Reconquest as the 
                                                 
10 The initial area of resistance is omitted from the analysis since, arguably, it is not fully representative of the 
dynamics of the frontier expansion to which the rest of Spain was subjected. In the provincial analysis, this 
territory comprises Asturias, Cantabria, and the three Basque provinces. Note, however, that the exclusion of 
these provinces is a conservative decision since our hypothesis may also be applicable to them. This region 
represents the case of a natural (long-term) repopulation process of a territory, and, therefore, a suitable 
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difference between the dates associated with each one of the subsequent frontier lines 
depicted in the map of the Reconquest in Figure 1. Third, we divide the surface area of each 
stage of the Reconquest by its duration in years. This provides a measure of the rate of 
Reconquest expressed in km2/year.11 A high value of this indicator implies that the 
Reconquest progressed quickly in that stage. Finally, we impute the estimated value of the 
rate of Reconquest to the provinces located in the respective stages. Since the area of a 
province can partially cover more than one stage of the Reconquest, we calculate the 
proportion of the provincial area within each one of the respective stages. We then compute 
the weighted average of the rate of Reconquest for each province, where the weights are 
given by the percentage of the provincial area conquered in each stage. This renders a 
different rate of Reconquest for each of the 45 provinces, as shown in Figure 1. Note, for 
instance, that if 50% of a province is reconquered rapidly, and the remainder slowly, our 
measure would reflect an average rate of Reconquest, rather than differentiate between both 
rates.12 However, in the municipality-level analysis we will explicitly allow for within-
province variation across municipalities, thus allowing for the possibility that different 
municipalities within the same province exhibit different rates of Reconquest. This more 
disaggregated analysis will enable us to better account for and understand the persistence 
side of our theory, since jurisdictional rights were granted at the local level and the 
evolution of land inequality is also inherent to the dynamics of each municipality. Note, in 
this regard, that provinces had limited competencies and were indeed regional branches of 
the central government. 
The variable used to measure current economic development is the figure for GDP per 
capita in 2005 provided by the Spanish National Statistics Institute. This study also employs 
a number of variables that may act as potential channels for explaining the effect of the 
Reconquest, as well as measures of pre-Reconquest economic development and a wide array 
of climatic, geographic, topographic and historical controls. We present all these variables 
in the sections in which they are used. Their definitions and sources are provided in Table 9 
at the end of the main text, while the descriptive statistics are reported in Supplementary 
Appendix B (Table A2). 
                                                                                                                                                      
comparison group, for which we can assume a rate of Reconquest of zero. As shown below, the effect of the 
rate of Reconquest is robust to the inclusion of these five provinces. 
11 More specifically, and in order to make the numbers manageable, this indicator is expressed in 100 
km2/year. 
12 We believe this way of proceeding does not conflict with provinces being considered as administrative units. 
Current provinces are indeed much more recent than the Reconquest itself. They were created in 1833 
following Javier de Burgos plan. In addition, provinces are used as observational units because of data 
availability and because that is the standard practice in this literature.  
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4. The Effect of the Reconquest on Current Development 
4.1. Initial Results 
Table 1 contains the results concerning the effect of the Reconquest on current levels of 
GDP per capita. The following equation is estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors with small-sample correction due to the 
relatively low cross-sectional dimension:13 
Yi = α + β1·Reconquesti + β2·Xi + ωi    (1) 
where Yi is log per capita GDP in 2005 in province i, α is a constant term, Reconquesti 
stands for our measure of the rate of Reconquest, Xi is a vector of control variables, and ωi is 
the error term. Entry 1 in Table 1 reports a highly significant, negative bivariate relationship 
between current GDP levels and the rate of Reconquest for the whole Spanish territory (50 
provinces). However, we prefer to conduct the analysis with only 45 provinces, i.e., 
removing those provinces that were never occupied by the Muslims and, as such, are not 
representative of the dynamics of frontier expansion applicable to the rest of Spain. Hence, 
in what follows we focus on the reduced sample of provinces. As with the whole Spain, 
entry 2 reports a statistically significant negative link between current output per capita and 
the rate of Reconquest. Our measure of the Reconquest alone explains 26% of the variation 
in current GDP per capita. This result indicates that the Reconquest is an important 
determinant of the current distribution of provincial output. We may compare two provinces 
with high and low rates of Reconquest to gain a sense of the size of the effect the 
Reconquest has had on current GDP per capita. For instance, Barcelona has a level of GDP 
per capita that is 48% higher than Seville (24,782 vs. 16,782). The latter has a rate of 
Reconquest (expressed in 100 km2/year) of 21.94, while for the former it is 1.58. The 
estimate in entry 2, –0.017, indicates that Barcelona should be 41.4% richer than Seville 
(e0.346 – 1 ≈ 0.414), which is very close to the real differences in income per capita. This 
result cannot be taken as conclusive, since the presence of potential omitted factors, if 
correlated with both the Reconquest and current economic development, would introduce an 
omitted variable bias in the relevant coefficient. Therefore, in the rest of this section we seek 
to exhaustively control for possible factors that may affect both the rate of Reconquest and 
current GDP per capita levels.  
A first set of controls is related to the biogeographic conditions 10,000 years ago, and the 
transition to early agriculture within the Neolithic Revolution. Accordingly, entry 3 
                                                 
13 Throughout the analysis, we apply the Davidson and MacKinnon (1993)’s recommended simple degrees of 
freedom correction by multiplying the estimated variance matrix by (n/n-k). This Stata’s built-in correction is 
particularly relevant here due to the relatively low cross-sectional dimension. 
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introduces the percentage of provincial area covered by wooded steppe versus dry steppe. 
These were the types of Neolithic vegetation (as indicators of soil quality and agricultural 
suitability) that prevailed on the Iberian Peninsula in prehistory.14 Entry 4 incorporates the 
predicted date of adoption of early agriculture using the information provided by Pinhasi, 
Fort, and Ammerman (2005) regarding the exact location of thirteen calibrated C-14 dates 
from Neolithic sites on the Iberian Peninsula.15 Statistically, none of the Neolithic controls 
enters significantly, whereas the effect of the Reconquest remains highly significant and 
unchanged in size. 
A second set of controls accounts for historical conditions that may be relevant factors 
omitted from our analysis. Entry 5 introduces a variable measuring the road density level in 
Roman times, which could affect the progress of the Christian conquests, and may also be 
related to local development potential. This variable enters insignificantly in the regression, 
without altering the effect of the Reconquest. Entry 6 controls for an indicator of pre-
Reconquest economic development, namely, urban population density in 800.16 Arguably, 
the Christian frontier could advance more slowly in more developed regions, because –for 
example– they offered stauncher resistance. The coefficient on urban population density in 
800 is negative and statistically significant, while the effect of the Reconquest remains 
negative and statistically highly significant.17 Following a similar reasoning, entry 7 controls 
for an indicator of the level of economic development (urban population density) just before 
the Christians conquered and colonized the territory. In addition, entry 8 includes a variable 
measuring the average urban population density in the Christian kingdoms at the time of the 
conquest. This variable sets out to reflect the general level of economic development of 
Castile or Aragon (depending on the case) immediately before the province was 
repopulated, since the type of colonization conducted could be affected by the conqueror’s 
level of prosperity at that time. A higher conqueror’s level of prosperity can also proxy for 
                                                 
14 The omitted category in the regression is dry steppe. Wooded steppe entailed a closed forest, including 
mixed conifer-broadleaf forest; and dry steppe implied sparse vegetation with open wooded vegetation types 
and a more temperate climate. See Olsson and Paik (2013) for more details.  
15 Olsson and Paik (2013) use this data source to analyze the effect of the early transition to agriculture on 
current development in the western agricultural core. 
16 In this regard, we follow Bairoch (1988), de Vries (1976), and more recently, AJR (2002), who argue that 
urbanization is a good proxy for economic development, since urban societies require an advanced agriculture 
and a developed transport infrastructure. 
17 One needs to be cautious with the negative coefficient on urban population density in 800 given the low 
number (only 8) of non-zero observations for that year. 
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the fact that the attacking technology was more advanced.18 These two last controls are 
insignificant in the regression, without affecting the coefficient on rate of Reconquest.19  
Entry 9 introduces an indicator measuring the number of centuries that the province was 
under Muslim domination, as a means to account for the legacy of being under Muslim rule 
for a longer time. Indeed, this may be a confounding variable since a longer Muslim 
domination could affect factors such as cultural values or the Spanish-Christian identity of 
the population. Interestingly, the coefficient on rate of Reconquest remains highly robust, 
while the new variable appears statistically insignificant.20 Entry 10 introduces a dummy 
variable capturing whether the province once belonged to the Crown of Aragon. Certain 
institutional characteristics of this former kingdom may have had an impact on economic 
development. The dynastic union between the Crown of Aragon and Castile was forged in 
1469 with the marriage of the Catholic Monarchs, but Aragon preserved its legal system and 
institutions until the War of Spanish Succession at the beginning of the eighteenth century. 
Arguably, these particularities during this early period could have influenced subsequent 
economic activity. Even though this historical control appears highly significant and 
positively related to current development levels, its inclusion does not affect our baseline 
results. Entry 11 introduces a dummy variable for Madrid, the Spanish capital, in order to 
control for the fact that its good economic performance may have been driven by its special 
administrative character.21 As expected, the coefficient on Madrid is positive and highly 
significant. 
We next control for various climatic, geographic and topographic factors that may be 
omitted from the baseline specification. Many scholars consider geography to be an 
important determinant of economic development (Gallup et al. 1999; Sachs 2003). 
Following AJR (2002), we may differentiate between simple and sophisticated geographic 
                                                 
18 As documented by, among others, González Jiménez (1989, p. 57), in medieval Castile military potential 
was closely associated with wealth. Cabrera Muñoz (2006, p. 126) provides several examples of the military 
power exhibited by the greatest and also wealthiest noble families in the Castilian part of Andalusia. 
19 The extent of Muslim weakness is another factor that is likely related to the rate of Reconquest, since it 
seems clear that the Reconquest advanced faster when the Muslim adversary was weaker. Given the inherent 
difficulty in measuring Muslim weakness at each point in time and the fact that this factor is orthogonal to the 
economic potential of the reconquered territories, we do not pursue any further its inclusion in the control set. 
Note that this orthogonality condition is likely to be satisfied given the full dismantlement of Muslim 
structures that took place, particularly after the expulsion of the Muslim population from the reconquered 
territories. See more details on this in Oto-Peralías and Romero-Ávila (2016). 
20 Another possible way to analyze the Muslim cultural legacy is by looking at the Moorish ancestry in the 
current population of each province. The correlation between Moorish ancestry and the number of centuries 
under Muslim domination is nonetheless below 5%.  In Section VII we discuss this question in more detail. 
21 In addition to being the seat of government bureaucracy, which represents a flow of rents to its inhabitants, 
Madrid is the hub of Spain’s radial communication network, reflecting traditional government centralism (Herr 
1958). This provides the capital of Spain with a privileged position as a business location. 
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explanations. The first type considers factors such as climate (with effects on work effort), 
soil fertility, and diseases. It predicts persistence in economic outcomes because geographic 
factors are time-invariant. Sophisticated geographic hypotheses are more appealing because 
they allow for the possibility that some geographic factors have a changing economic role 
over time. Applied to the Spanish case, access to the Mediterranean Sea may have been 
more decisive during the Middle Ages, with subsequent access to the Atlantic through trade 
with the Americas, and more recently during the industrialization period to the Bay of 
Biscay. In addition, coal reserves played an important role during the industrialization 
period, but not all the provinces had their own reserves. Transportation costs –measured, for 
instance, through access to the sea or distance from major trading partners and industrial 
centers in Europe– could also have been more important during the nineteenth century, 
when commercial relations across regions and countries intensified. In order to dispel 
doubts, we next control for variables that may be associated with both sets of geographic 
hypotheses. We begin with factors exhibiting geographic variation along a North-South 
gradient that mimics the direction of the Reconquest. The incorporation of latitude, in entry 
12, (which enters insignificantly) does not affect the statistical significance or size of the 
coefficient on rate of Reconquest. Therefore, our results do not simply capture the fact that 
southern Spanish regions are poorer. 
Entries 13-15 control for such variables as temperature, rainfall and humidity, which may 
also affect soil quality and its suitability for crops that require large estates (and in turn 
induce the concentration of economic power in the hands of the landed elite). Higher aridity 
and less rainfall may also require a higher concentration of land on the grounds of economic 
efficiency and profitability (Brenan 1943). Hence, they may be factors that confuse the 
long-term effect of the Reconquest on development. It is worth stressing that the baseline 
results remain fairly unaltered, with only rainfall entering significantly. The baseline result 
remains unchanged when entry 16 introduces a direct measure of soil quality constructed on 
the basis of several dimensions (nutrient availability and retention capacity, rooting 
conditions, oxygen availability to roots, excess salts, toxicity and workability) from 
FAO/IIASA (2010) data, which enters with a highly significant and positive coefficient. 
Entries 17-19 exploit provincial variation in the suitability of land for such cash crops as 
sugar, cotton and tobacco in order to capture the possibility of a contrast in the suitability of 
land for large plantations in the South of Spain as opposed to the North (as in the US). It is 
worth noting that none of these three controls appears statistically significant or affects the 
main findings. The introduction, in entries 20 and 21, of average altitude and terrain 
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ruggedness does not alter the baseline results either, with only the latter being marginally 
significant. 
Entries 22-33 control for geographic attributes related to transportation costs that include 
access to the Mediterranean Sea, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Cantabrian Sea, a dummy 
indicator for being an island, a coast dummy, coast length over surface area, distance from 
the coast, border with Portugal, and the natural log of distances from Madrid and London, 
the latter being considered the technological frontier. Two other distances from locations 
that were arguably important for European development are included. They are distance 
from Mainz as a proxy for the spread of the printing press (Dittmar, 2011), and distance 
from Paris, which can be considered the cradle of the Enlightenment movement that 
promoted the expansion and accessibility of useful knowledge as a cornerstone of 
industrialization (Squicciarini and Voigtlander, 2015).22 Of all these controls, access to the 
Cantabrian Sea, border with Portugal and log distances from Paris and Mainz are 
statistically significant and negatively associated with current development, whereas access 
to the Mediterranean Sea enters with a statistically significant positive coefficient. Most 
importantly, the effect of the Reconquest remains fairly robust to these additions. Entries 
34-37 control for indicators accounting for natural resource endowments that include the 
percentage of agricultural land in 1900, the percentage of arable land in 1962, a coal dummy 
in 1860, and log coal output in 1860. Only the coal dummy is statistically significant and 
with a positive coefficient, whereas the baseline results remain unaltered.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
4.2. Baseline Specification and Robustness Checks 
Column 1 in Table 2 includes in the same specification all the controls that are 
individually significant at the 10% level or better.23 This is our paper’s baseline 
specification. Even in this case, the coefficient on the Reconquest measure is significant at 
the 1% level, and its size is only slightly reduced from -0.017 to -0.016. Besides, the Madrid 
indicator, soil quality and ruggedness continue to be statistically significant and positively 
associated with current development, whereas log distance from Paris has a statistically 
significant negative effect on current GDP per capita. The strength of the effect of the rate 
of Reconquest on current development is illustrated in Figure 2 by a scatter plot of the two 
                                                 
22 These specifications allow us to address the issue of the extent to which the speed of Reconquest varied 
relative to a uniform movement along the north-east/south-west axis. If our baseline results remain robust to 
the inclusion of these controls, that would go a long way in addressing endogeneity concerns. 
23 The variable urban population density in 800 that was found individually significant at the 5% is not 
included because the existence of only 8 non-zero observations could distort the results for the whole analysis. 
In addition, we omit log distance from Mainz due to a correlation of 98% with distance from Paris. 
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variables, after conditioning on the set of controls included in column 1. The partial R-
square of the rate of Reconquest is 34.9% in this baseline specification. It is remarkable that 
an indicator measuring a historical event that occurred many centuries ago has such a large 
explanatory power for explaining current income.24 
A typical concern of empirical analyses with a limited number of observations is the 
possibility that a few extreme cases drive the results. Columns 2-7 in Table 2 show that our 
findings are fairly robust to removing outliers detected by the following procedures: 
leverage, standardized residuals, studentized residuals, Cook’s distance, DFITS, Welsch 
distance, and DF-Beta. Likewise, the effect of the Reconquest remains fairly unchanged 
when particularly rich areas such as Madrid and Barcelona are excluded from the analysis 
(column 8). Similar results are obtained when employing robust estimation that corrects for 
the effect of outliers (column 9). Our baseline findings also remain robust to using a 
quantile regression approach (column 10), as a way to assess the existence of an effect at the 
median and not only at the mean of the distribution.  
In addressing the concern that our results hinge on the particular indicator of Reconquest 
used, we re-estimate the baseline specification with three alternative indicators. First, an 
alternative indicator of rate of Reconquest that assigns to each province the rate of 
Reconquest corresponding to the Reconquest stage in which a province’s geographic 
centroid is located. By doing so, there is no need to calculate a weighted average of the rate 
of Reconquest, and standard errors can be clustered at the level of stage of Reconquest. 
Second, another alternative indicator of the rate of Reconquest that divides this historical 
process into stages of the same duration.25 Third, a dummy variable indicating whether the 
province was reconquered after the collapse of the Almohad Caliphate in 1212 following the 
Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa, which enabled the Christian armies to conquer a vast 
territory in a short period of time. The results appear in columns 11-13 of Table 2. It is 
                                                 
24 Appendix C incorporates the rate of Reconquest into the baseline specification in alternative functional 
forms: in quadratic form, in log-linear form and in quartiles. In the quadratic specification, the rate of 
Reconquest terms are highly significant, and the negative marginal effect appears linear for most of the values 
of the rate of Reconquest, only flattening at a value of rate of Reconquest corresponding to the 90th percentile 
(17.9). In the log-linear specification, log rate of Reconquest enters with a highly significant negative 
coefficient. In the quartiles specification, the dummies for the second, third and fourth quartiles of rate of 
Reconquest exhibit a negative coefficient. However, it is the fourth quartile corresponding to the areas in 
which the Reconquest was conducted faster that has the statistically significant larger negative effect on 
current development. 
25 More specifically, provinces are classified according to the century in which they were reconquered. For 
each century, we compute the total land area reconquered in that period, differentiating between the areas 
conquered by Castile and Aragon. Then, the rate of Reconquest in a given province is estimated as the total 
land area that was reconquered in the century in which that province was reconquered. 
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remarkable that the three alternative Reconquest indicators enter with a statistically 
significant negative coefficient, thus corroborating our baseline findings.26  
[Insert Figure 2 and Table 2 about here] 
In Appendix E, we redo all the estimations in Table 2 with two other alternative small-
sample corrections: 1) estimating standard errors through wild bootstrap, and 2) using the 
leverage-adjusted HC2 estimator recommended by Imbens and Kolesar (2012) and Samii 
and Aronow (2012). In both cases, our baseline findings remain largely unchanged. Another 
potential concern is the presence of spatial correlation, which may reduce the true precision 
of the effect. We re-estimate the models in Table 2 and check that the statistical significance 
of the coefficient on the rate of Reconquest is not reduced when using standard errors 
corrected for spatial dependence. For that purpose, we use the Jeanty (2012) Stata command 
–sphac– with a cutoff of 200 km (see also Allen, 2015). Unaltered results to this change are 
reported in Appendix F.  
Skeptics may still be concerned with the fact that the Reconquest is very correlated with a 
North-South gradient for Spain, with a richer North (particularly the Basque Country and 
Catalonia) and a poorer South (mostly Andalusia). This has been previously addressed in 
several ways. First, we exclude the three rich Basque provinces from the baseline analysis, 
which partially mitigate this problem. Second, we show that the effect of rate of Reconquest 
is robust to the inclusion of latitude, and log distances from London, Paris and Mainz. Third, 
we also omit such potential outliers as Madrid and Barcelona. In addition to the 
aforementioned robustness checks, i) we incorporate a high-order (cubic) latitude/longitude 
polynomial into the baseline specification, with the coefficient on rate of Reconquest being 
robust to this addition. ii) We regress the rate of Reconquest on the set of controls in the 
baseline specification, save the residuals and use them in a regression of latitude on the 
residuals.27 It is worth noting that latitude appears unrelated to the residuals that are the part 
of the rate of Reconquest orthogonal to the controls, with an R2 of 0.001 and a p-value 
associated with the coefficient on the residuals of 0.893. Likewise, once we control for the 
baseline control set, there is no relationship between latitude and Reconquest rate. All these 
results are reported in Table A9 in Appendix G. iii) The next section conducts the analysis 
at municipal level controlling for province fixed effects and for dummies of deciles in 
latitude. 
                                                 
26 See Appendix D for a replication of tables 1 and 2 when using the full sample of provinces. 
27 In this regard, we follow Sakalli (2014) who faced an East-West gradient problem in his analysis of the 
effect of coexistence of different religious groups on Islamic religiosity, secular education and development in 
the context of the deportation of the Armenian population in Turkey in 1915-16. 
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As an additional robustness check, we only exploit the variation from the 16 regions 
corresponding to the respective stages shown in Figure 1 (9 in Castile and 7 in Aragon). 
This analysis is thus conducted with only 16 observations, in which the weighted average of 
output per capita in 2005 for the territory corresponding to each Reconquest stage (using 
provincial surface area in each stage as weights) is regressed on the rate of Reconquest at 
the stage level. As expected, there appears to be a statistically significant negative 
relationship between both variables.28  
5. Sensitivity analysis 
5.1. Municipality-level Analysis 
Although the relationship between the rate of Reconquest and current GDP appears robust 
to the inclusion of many geographic and historical controls, as well as to the removal of 
outliers, a possible objection is that some unobservable province-level characteristics are 
driving this result. One way to address this concern is to conduct the analysis at a finer level, 
namely, using municipality data, and test whether the results hold even when conditional 
upon province-specific fixed effects. This test is quite strong, and allows us to exploit 
within-province variation in the conditions surrounding the Reconquest. The inclusion of 
such powerful fixed effects enables us to account for any systematic and structural 
particularities related to the history of each province, which cannot be controlled explicitly 
in a province-level analysis. It also provides an alternative way to deal with the issue of 
small sample. For this exercise, we create a dataset of more than 8,000 municipalities in 
Spain. As proxies for income at local level, we use current data for average socioeconomic 
conditions, average number of vehicles per household, and labor force activity rate, which 
appear clearly linked to economic development. This is corroborated by the existence of a 
high correlation with GDP per capita at provincial level (the correlation is 0.81 with average 
socioeconomic condition, 0.54 with average number of vehicles per household, and 0.73 
with labor force activity rate). 
The municipality-level analysis is conducted with three different measures of rate of 
Reconquest computed at municipal level. First, the baseline measure is obtained by 
imputing to each municipality the rate of Reconquest corresponding to the Reconquest 
phase to which the municipality belongs. As with the province-level analysis, here we 
distinguish between the stages of the Reconquest in Castile (9 stages if we exclude the 
initial resistance area) and Aragon (7 stages). By exploiting within-province variation across 
municipalities, we allow for the possibility of different rates of Reconquest across a 
                                                 
28 A scatterplot and some regressions, controlling for the latitude coordinate corresponding to the centroid of 
each Reconquest stage, are presented in Appendix H.  
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province’s municipalities. Second, we construct a dichotomous indicator of rate of 
Reconquest, which equals one if the rate of Reconquest corresponding to municipality i is 
higher than the provincial mean value. This allows us to exploit the discontinuity in rate of 
Reconquest across municipalities within each province, in a similar spirit to a border 
specification. Third, we proceed in a similar way, but exploiting those cases in which there 
is a stronger discontinuity. The binary indicator is now defined as one, if rate of Reconquest 
is higher than a 1.25-fold the provincial mean value.  
Table 3 presents the results clustering standard errors at the level of stage of Reconquest. 
All regressions in Panel A include province dummies and a relatively large control set, 
which comprises the municipalities’ total population (in logs) to control for differences in 
municipal size, latitude, and geographic factors related to transportation costs, such as 
distance to Madrid, distance to the coast, and distance to the nearest provincial capital (all 
distances entering in linear and square form), and a provincial capital dummy, as well as 
several additional variables accounting for the municipalities’ climate, geography and 
topography. These include altitude, annual average temperature, annual rainfall, and seven 
dimensions measuring soil quality (nutrient availability and retention capacity, rooting 
capacity, oxygen availability to roots, excess salts, toxicity, and workability).29 Despite the 
fact this municipality-level specification controlling for province fixed effects goes some 
way in addressing the North-South gradient concern –as variation in latitude within 
provinces is much smaller than when considering Spain as a whole–, we deepen into this 
issue by further incorporating latitude fixed effects (one dummy variable for each decile in 
latitude). By doing so, we are able to exploit variation within provinces and within each 
small range of latitude, i.e., within small North-South distances. These results are reported 
in Panel B of Table 3. 
It is worth noting that the three different measures of rate of Reconquest are negatively 
associated with the three proxies for local development, in most cases at the 5% significance 
level or higher. Interestingly, when the rate of Reconquest is constructed in a way that it 
captures a higher discontinuity, the negative effect becomes more pronounced, as expected. 
All these findings carry over to the more complete specification that incorporates ten 
latitude decile dummies. This alleviates our concern that unobserved heterogeneity at 
provincial level and/or a North-South gradient might be the driving force behind the 
                                                 
29 The inclusion of all these controls together, along with the province-level fixed effects, is particularly 
important here. This is because with only 45 observations in the province-level analysis, we could not control 
for all the individual regressors together, since we would run out of degrees of freedom. Instead, we opted for 
including in the same specification only those regressors that were found individually significant at least at the 
10% level. 
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significant effect of the Reconquest on current development found in the province-level 
analysis.30 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Since spatial correlation in this municipality-level analysis can be substantial, as an 
alternative to clustering the standard errors at the level of stage of Reconquest, we redo 
Table 3 using standard errors corrected for spatial dependence following Jeanty (2012). We 
use a cutoff of 100 km beyond which spatial correlation is assumed to be zero. As an 
additional robustness check, we conduct the analysis with standard errors clustered at the 
province level rather than at the level of stage of Reconquest. Our baseline findings in Table 
3 remain fully robust to these changes. Due to space considerations, these results are 
presented in Appendix J. 
5.2. Falsification Test and Balancedness 
This section conducts a falsification exercise to show that the rate of Reconquest is not 
negatively related to the level of economic development in the pre-Reconquest era. A main 
threat to the validity of our analysis is the possibility that areas conquered faster were 
initially poorer, which could have facilitated a rapid conquest. If those areas conquered 
faster were worse off even before the Reconquest, then the observed relationship between 
the rate of Reconquest and current income may be driven by the territories’ intrinsic 
characteristics, rather than by the type of colonization conducted by Christians. However, it 
is very unlikely that the rate of Reconquest hinged on the territories’ economic 
development, since the pace of the advance of the Christian frontier was arguably caused 
mainly by the relative military weakness of the Muslim territory in each period. Therefore, 
the rate of Reconquest was the consequence of an exogenous factor with respect to the 
territories’ economic potential. 
Our aim is to verify that our indicator of the Reconquest does not have a statistically 
significant negative association with economic development and other outcome variables 
before the Reconquest. We measure pre-Reconquest development primarily through city 
                                                 
30 As we did for the province-level analysis, we can conduct the analysis using only the 16 Reconquest stages 
as observational units. The dependent variable in this case is the average value of each of the three proxies for 
local development, and the independent variable is the rate of Reconquest. Not surprisingly, there exists a 
negative relationship between both variables, even after controlling for the latitude coordinate corresponding 
to the centroid of each Reconquest stage. A scatterplot and the regression outputs are presented in Appendix I. 
An additional exercise, shown also in Appendix I, is to regress local development on the 16 stages-of-
reconquest fixed effects (one dummy variable for each stage) and latitude, for the sample of 7644 
municipalities. This specification only exploits within stage-of-reconquest variation. The absence of a 
statistically significant relationship among the three municipality-level outcome variables and latitude within 
Reconquest stages is reassuring that a North-South gradient is not driving our results. 
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population and urban population density in 800, which is the earliest year for which urban 
population data are available. Given that the Reconquest had hardly begun at that time, it 
serves our purpose. We also consider additional outcome indicators related to pre-
Reconquest development. These include years since the transition to agriculture, ancient 
(pre-medieval) settlements over surface area, Roman road density (total roads and main 
roads), the ratio of the number of locations where imperial coinage was found to surface 
area, Roman villas over surface area, and density of bishoprics circa 600. 
To assess whether these variables can be used as plausible measures of early development, 
we look at their correlation with an indicator of land suitability for agriculture –the 
percentage of agricultural area in 1900–, since pre-industrial prosperity is commonly 
considered to be related to soil fertility and, more specifically, to agricultural land potential. 
Remarkably, all the indicators –except for years since the transition to agriculture– are 
positively correlated with the percentage of agricultural area. In the case of city population 
and the density of urban population in 800, Roman road density –total and main roads–, 
presence of imperial Roman coinage, and Roman villas, correlations are statistically 
significant.31 Very similar correlations follow when we employ the variable percentage of 
arable land in 1962 as a measure of land suitability for agriculture. These results indicate 
that most indicators of pre-Reconquest development reveal expected relationships with 
agricultural land potential, which makes us more confident about their reliability. 
Panel A of Table 4 provides the results on the relationship between the rate of Reconquest 
and early development. It is worth noting that the rate of Reconquest is not negatively 
associated with any of the measures of early economic development, after conditioning on a 
meaningful set of controls.32 Fairly similar findings follow when we look at the bivariate 
relationship between rate of Reconquest and pre-Reconquest development, which appears 
marginally significant at the 10% level (though with a positive sign) only in the case of 
ancient settlements (see Panel B of Table 4). The above findings suggest that the effect of 
the Reconquest does not merely represent the perpetuation of differences in economic 
development that already existed before the Reconquest, or mean that provinces conquered 
more rapidly started off at a disadvantage or were intrinsically poorer. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
                                                 
31 For total Roman road density, the coefficient of correlation is significant at the 10.7% level. Detailed results 
are provided in Appendix K. 
32 This analysis omits those control variables that are meaningless when the dependent variable is a measure of 
pre-Reconquest development, namely, Crown of Aragon, Madrid, border with Portugal, the coal dummy, and 
distance from Paris as the cradle of the Enlightenment movement. 
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We next present a balancedness table showing the correlation between rate of Reconquest 
and urbanization levels measured through density of urban population from 800 to 1850. 
The evidence shown in Panel A of Table 5 mostly points to a lack of a statistically 
significant relationship between rate of Reconquest and urbanization levels for more than a 
millennium.33 Therefore, neither initial nor subsequent development prior to the arrival of 
industrialization around 1860 is clearly correlated with rate of Reconquest. This indicates 
two things. First, as already pointed out, those territories conquered faster were not initially 
poorer. Second, the adverse effect of a fast Reconquest on aggregate economic development 
did not become apparent before industrialization. We extend on this point in Section 6.  
Panel B of Table 5 further presents the bivariate relationship of rate of Reconquest with 
soil quality measured both at provincial and municipal levels, as well as with eight other 
measures of land quality and land productivity. With the exception of soil quality at 
province level, there does not appear to exist a statistically significant relationship. As 
regards the positive correlation between rate of Reconquest and soil quality at province 
level, one could argue that it is this confounding factor, rather than the pace of the 
Reconquest, that affected the concentration of economic power in the form of land (which is 
a main channel through which the effect of the Reconquest is found to operate) and in turn 
the level of development. However, there are reasons to believe this is not the case. First, 
our baseline specification already controls for soil quality. Second, there is not a statistically 
significant relationship of rate of Reconquest neither with soil quality at municipal level, nor 
with eight different proxies for land quality and productivity measured at province level. 
Third, it is clear that what matters for the concentration of land in large estates regions is the 
historical process of Reconquest rather than soil quality. This is because our data indicate 
the existence of a positive (instead of an expectedly negative) relationship between the 
extent of land inequality (measured through the percentage of landless workers over the 
total agricultural active population in 1797) and soil quality for the Spanish provinces, with 
a correlation coefficient of 0.62. This contrasts with the existing evidence that supports that 
areas with better soil quality historically experienced a higher demand for land, which 
should be conducive to higher land fragmentation (see Baten and Hippe, 2013, and 
Cinnirella and Hornung, 2013, for such evidence across the European regions and Prussian 
counties in the nineteenth century, and references therein). Hence, it is reasonable to think 
that had the Reconquest not occurred, the more fertile provinces would have given rise to 
small and medium-size holdings. Fourth, in the context of the two-stage-least-squares 
(2SLS) analysis implemented in Section 7 –in which the rate of Reconquest is found to 
                                                 
33 There appears to be only a marginally significant positive relationship for the cases of density of urban 
population in 1000, 1200 and 1700. 
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affect current development mainly through land inequality–, when historical land inequality 
is instrumented with soil quality (instead of with rate of Reconquest), it no longer affects 
current development. However, rate of Reconquest that entered exogenously would still 
exert a statistically significant negative impact on log GDP per capita in 2005. These results 
appear in Appendix L. This makes it clear that current output is affected by structural 
inequality stemming from the conditions surrounding the Reconquest rather than from soil 
quality.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
6. The Timing of the Effect of the Reconquest 
The above results confirm the strong and robust negative effect that the Reconquest has 
had on current per capita output. A question that requires further study is when this effect 
actually took place. This is a key issue because it provides clues about the nature and causes 
of the effect. On the one hand, if our findings were due to –for example– some geographic 
confounding factor, the effect of the Reconquest would probably be visible at all times.34 On 
the other hand, the analysis of the timing of the effect is useful for considering the 
mechanisms at work. For example, if the main implications of the rapid advance of the 
Christian frontier were related to the destruction of Muslim technologies or to a lack of 
agglomeration economies due to low population density, the negative effect should have 
become apparent soon after the Reconquest. 
To implement this analysis, we estimate a panel specification that regresses each 
province’s level of development relative to the national average over the 1000-2005 period 
on the interaction between rate of Reconquest and time dummies, with data measured at the 
beginning of each century up to 1800, and then at 1860, 1930, 1970 and 2005. The 
interactions start in 1500, which roughly corresponds to the year in which the Reconquest 
ended. The specification takes the form: 
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where tiy ,  stands for each province’s relative level of development. For the periods prior 
to 1860 for which there are no available data on GDP per capita, we employ density of 
urban population. tD  is an indicator variable for each time period, Reconquesti represents 
the province-level rate of Reconquest, iX  includes those controls that may have a varying 
effect over time such as soil quality, access to the Cantabrian Sea, a coal dummy, access to 
                                                 
34 In this regard, the evidence presented so far dismisses such a possibility, since the effect is quite robust to 
many geographic controls, and the rate of Reconquest is not related to indicators of early development. 
24 
the Mediterranean Sea and log distance from Paris, and as such they are interacted with the 
time dummies. iα  and tθ  represent province and time fixed effects, respectively.  
As shown in Table 6, the panel specification including the interacted rate of Reconquest as 
well as time and province fixed effects renders a coefficient on rate of Reconquest that 
becomes negative and statistically significant since 1860, around the time when Spain 
entered the industrialization phase (Pascual and Sudriá 2002; Rosés 2006).35 The interaction 
terms for the periods prior to industrialization enter with a negative, though statistically 
insignificant, coefficient. These results suggest that the adverse effect of a fast Reconquest 
became more apparent when industrialization arrived. The same essentially holds for the 
panel specifications that add interactions of time dummies with soil quality, access to the 
Cantabrian Sea, a coal dummy and access to the Mediterranean Sea, respectively. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
In Appendix M (Table A17) we also estimate specification (2) with data only covering the 
1860-2005 period. By doing so, we do not mix in the same specification two different 
proxies for economic development such as density of urban population and GDP per capita. 
The analysis is conducted with both relative levels of GDP per capita and relative levels of 
industrial output per capita, as alternative measures of province-level relative economic 
development. In this specification the interaction term for 1860 is omitted, since it is taken 
as the reference period. The evidence appears in line with that obtained for the specification 
covering the full period.36 Appendix O pursues this question further by taking into account 
that the exact timing of industrialization in Spain may be endogenous. The unreported 
evidence indicates that the negative effect of a fast rate of Reconquest became more 
pervasive when the opportunity to industrialize arrived.  
7. Mechanisms at work 
                                                 
35 The fact that Spain began its industrialization around 1860 is well reflected in the evolution of the railway 
network, which grew from less than 400 kilometers in 1855 to 5,076 kilometers in 1866 (Pascual and Sudriá 
2002). 
36 Appendix N contains several tables regressing log GDP per capita in 2005 on the alternative proxies for 
level of development available in Spain since the year 800: density of urban population over the 800-1850 
period, urbanization rate over the 1600-2001 period, and log industrial output per capita between 1860 and 
2005. Over the 800-1000 period, one can observe negative correlations, which could be due to the low number 
of non-zero observations for such periods. From 1000 to about 1850 correlations appear highly insignificant 
and very low, whereas it is only since 1860 that higher correlations are observed. This suggests that income 
persistence in Spain is a late nineteenth- and twentieth-century phenomenon. A very intuitive picture of these 
correlations is provided in Figure A6 in Appendix N. In the same appendix there is also a table showing the 
relatively high and positive correlation among the three development proxies at several points in time since 
1860.  
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In Section 2, we argued that the rate of Reconquest was a crucial factor affecting the 
outcome of the repopulation process. A rapid rate is generally associated with imperfect 
colonization, with negative consequences for each region’s subsequent development. The 
rapid advance of the Christian frontier made the task of repopulation more difficult and 
demanding, which originated several problems, such as scarcity of settlers and resources, 
defense requirements for vast territories, and the governance of a large conquered Muslim 
population. What follows describes the potential channels that may help explain the effect 
of the Reconquest on current development, as well as the way they can be measured. We 
also discuss the consistency of each alternative explanation with the observed timing of the 
effect. 
7.1. Structural Inequality Stemming from Land Inequality and Political Power 
Concentration 
Spanish historiography suggests that two key outcomes of the repopulation process were 
how land was distributed and who held political power. This constitutes our main 
hypothesis concerning the main channel through which the Reconquest affected current 
development, and the argument deserves to be further developed. The rate of Reconquest 
affected the possibility that either individual settlers or the nobility and military orders 
gained control over the newly conquered territories. As historically documented, a greater 
area to be repopulated increased the likelihood that nobles and military orders were called 
upon to participate in the repopulation and defense of such vast territories. Consequently, a 
rapid frontier expansion favored an initial political equilibrium biased toward the nobility, 
which led to the concentration of political power –in the form of jurisdictional rights– and 
economic power –in the form of land– in the hands of this social group.  
The consequences of this unequal distribution of economic and political power were 
pervasive. Jurisdictional rights provided the landowning nobility with the legal and political 
apparatus that afforded them de jure political power over the broad mass of the population. 
This meant the landless peasantry became attached to the nobles’ lands, and the judiciary, 
the right of taxation and local council were controlled by the nobility. Likewise, the nobility 
could run de facto extractive institutions aimed at exploiting the peasantry through such 
mechanisms as severe restrictions on land and grain transactions, labor contracts with caps 
on agricultural wages, land tenure systems implying short-term leases whose conditions 
were reviewed annually, and the obligation to use the nobles’ mill to grind the grain. In this 
context, institutions of equal opportunity and property rights access for the agricultural 
proletariat of large estates –who were the majority in southern Spain– were completely 
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absent (Brenan 1943; Dominguez-Ortiz 1955). This created a society characterized by a 
high level of social and political inequality. 
This situation persisted over time, in a clear process of path dependence. It can be 
explained by several factors. First, the decline in population after the Christian conquest due 
to migrations, the expulsion of the Muslim population, and epidemics favored the 
establishment and consolidation of a type of extensive agriculture based on large estates 
(Malefakis 1970). Second, the landed nobility used their political power to illegally usurp 
lands and monopolize common lands (Cabrera Muñoz 1989). Third, such inefficient 
institutions as the creation of entailed estates protected by law (mayorazgos) and other 
regulations made land non-conveyable, and jurisdictional rights were hereditary. The liberal 
reforms of the nineteenth century derogated the legal apparatus of the Old Regime, but 
unlike in other countries like France, they failed to suppress nobles’ landownership and 
hence change the balance of power in society (García-Ormaechea 2002). Finally, the 
process of disentailment of communal and ecclesiastical landownership known as 
desamortización aggravated the pattern of land concentration in a few hands because land 
was bought up at very low prices by the rich, the bourgeoisie, and nobles (Brenan 1943; 
Herr 1974; Carrión 1975).37 In Brenan’s words, “this is the class that since 1843 has held 
political power in Spain –a middle class not enriched by trade or industry but by the 
ownership of land” (Brenan, 1943, p. 109).38  
As argued by AJR (2002), when a major shock like the spread of industrial technology 
occurred with the arrival of the opportunity to industrialize, the landed elite may not support 
investing in the new technology for fear of losing its political power. The reasons are that 
potential entrepreneurs with productive ideas may not form part of the elite, and thus feel 
their property rights are not secured. Also, the landed elite may block these investments if 
those who mostly benefit from them are not part of the elite, thus preventing any shift in the 
balance of power toward the emerging capitalist class.39 In the case of Spain, particularly in 
                                                 
37 The disentailment absorbed a large mass of capital, which would have been otherwise devoted to forming an 
industrial base or constructing the railroad network with domestic capital. 
38 According to Nadal (1997, p.64), the suppression of the Ancient Regime and the process of land 
disentailment clearly acted in favor of the landed nobility –which increased the ownership of land holdings to 
a much larger extent than the loss in jurisdictional rights– and against the mass of landless peasants, who 
shifted from a status of serfdom with access to land to one of free men deprived of land. And those that 
remained as tenants experienced a dramatic increase in the rent paid to landlords. All this would betray the 
spirit of the liberal legislators of the Cádiz Constitution of 1812, which was nonetheless abolished in March 
1814 by a military coup by Ferdinand VII who restored an absolutist regime until the mid 1830s. 
39 Galor, Moav, and Vollrath (2009) provide an interesting link by which land inequality may lead the landed 
elite to block education reforms, and thus, the transition from an agricultural to an industrial society. This 
argument may be applicable to the Spanish case, given the large differences in land inequality across 
provinces. Our evidence below shows that a faster rate of Reconquest working through a more unequal 
distribution of economic power is associated with lower literacy and enrolment rates. 
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large estates regions, the broad mass of the population was poor and no strong bourgeoisie 
arose, as the entrenched nobility and the middle class preferred to devote their capital to 
buying large land lots. As a result of this, the industrial revolution largely failed, and unlike 
in other countries like Britain (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2008), the landed elite did not see its 
power curtailed and no significant shift in the balance of power occurred. In contrast, in 
those regions that had a more equal distribution of economic and political power, like the 
Basque Country and Catalonia, the arrival of the opportunity to industrialize clearly shifted 
the balance of power toward the emerging industrial bourgeoisie. 
According to this line of reasoning, the presence of extractive institutions that do not 
provide equal opportunity and property rights access for a broad cross-section of society 
became more important with the arrival of new technologies that required the economic 
participation of broad segments of the population, most of which were not part of the ruling 
elite. This appears to be the case with industrialization which, in order to succeed, would 
require the involvement of new entrepreneurs, innovators, and middle-class citizens.40 
Applied to the Spanish case, inequality in the access to land (a key historical factor of 
production) and the associated structural inequality in the access to economic opportunities 
(schooling, health care, access to credit, etc) precluded large segments of the population in 
large estates provinces from participating in economic activity when Spain entered the 
industrialization phase.41 This contributed to the failure of southern Spain to industrialize 
(Nadal 1997; Nadal, Carreras and Sudriá 1987). For these reasons, the role of land 
inequality and political power concentration as mechanisms for explaining the effect of the 
Reconquest on income appears fairly consistent with the possibility that this effect became 
apparent during industrialization. 
One might wonder whether the mechanism proposed is based on a conflict between the 
landed elite and the masses (as in Engerman and Sokoloff, 2002, and AJR, 2002), or on a 
conflict between the landed nobility and the emerging industrial elite (as in Galor, Moav and 
Vollrath, 2009). Arguably, we place more emphasis on the existence of a conflict of the 
landed nobility and the landless masses, which were excluded from participating in 
economic activity when the opportunity to industrialize arrived. Among others, Domenech 
(2012, 2015) provides evidence of the existence of rural conflict between the landed elite 
and the landless masses before the Spanish civil war. This does not preclude the possibility 
                                                 
40 In AJR (2002, p. 1273)’s words, “extractive institutions may become much more inappropriate with the 
arrival of new technologies. [...] Therefore, there are reasons to expect that institutional differences should 
matter more during the age of industry”. 
41 See Appendix P for a more detailed account of the implications of persistent inequality in the distribution of 
land in Spain. 
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of a conflict between the landed and industrial elites. However, for the case of the large 
estates regions of Spain, we are skeptical about that possibility, since strictly speaking the 
industrial elite as a social group was very small. One of the reasons for this is that the 
middle classes preferred to buy disentailed land, rather than invest in industry or building 
the railway network. The implications of this prevalence of the landed elite were pervasive. 
By blocking education and equal opportunity access to the masses, the landowning nobility 
ensured excess of agrarian labor supply and cheap wages, thereby preventing a rural exodus 
to the cities. In addition, the existence of a broad mass of the population formed by 
impoverished landless workers, who lacked human capital and financial resources, was not 
conducive to the accumulation of capital and the creation of an agricultural sector that could 
provide a strong market for industrial goods (Tortellá, 2000). Without having necessarily 
existed a conflict between the landed nobility and an industrial elite, all these factors 
negatively affected the possibility of successful industrialization in large estates regions 
(Tedde de Lorca, 1985). 
One might also wonder why the presence of extractive institutions for the landless 
majority may not exert an adverse effect on economic activity even before industrialization 
when an agrarian economic structure predominated. The reason is as follows. In an 
agricultural society (like preindustrial Spain) in which the main investment opportunities are 
in agriculture, economic and political inequality may not impair aggregate production. This 
is because “the elite can invest in land and employ the rest of the population, and so will 
have relatively good incentives to increase output” (AJR 2002, pp. 1272-3). Along similar 
lines, Chaney and Hornbeck (2015), found for preindustrial Valencia that there was 
relatively high output per capita because fertility and mortality did not respond due to the 
presence of extractive institutions on the peasantry. Similar Malthusian dynamics are likely 
to apply to southern Spanish regions. In addition, in pre-industrial times, other factors such 
as soil fertility or environmental suitability may have been more important for production.42 
In this sense, until industrialization, the higher land fertility of some of the large estates 
regions was sufficient to make them stand among the wealthiest in Spain.43 In short, the 
adverse effect of extractive institutions on aggregate production may be inconsequential in 
                                                 
42 The plantation system in the Caribbean that employed slave labor is a case in point, since a small landed 
elite forced the vast majority of the population to work for low wages. 
43 For example, still in 1860, at the beginning of the industrialization period, Andalusia was the second 
wealthiest region, ahead of Catalonia and the Basque Country, with a level of GDP per capita about 36 
percentage points above the Spanish average. Yet just seventy years later, in 1930, Andalusia was among the 
poorest regions, with a level of GDP per capita of only 77% of the Spanish average (data from Rosés et al. 
2010). See Appendix Q for a case study of our theory applied to the diverging development paths of Seville 
versus Barcelona. 
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an agrarian economy, but not in an industrial one. That is why the negative effect of the rate 
of Reconquest mostly emerges from 1860 onwards. 
We employ several variables to account for the sources of structural inequality. We 
measure political power concentration of the nobility –and in turn the extractive institutions 
to which it gave rise– with an indicator from the 1787 population census: the percentage of 
population entities (núcleos de población) under seigneurial jurisdiction that includes both 
nobles and military orders.44 Land inequality is measured through the percentage of landless 
workers over the total agricultural active population measured both in 1797 and 1956, which 
proxy for the concentration of land in the hands of the nobles. The class of landless laborers, 
which can be traced back to the fifteenth century, was a by-product of the nobility’s high 
concentration of land (Cabrera Muñoz 1989).45 For robustness purposes, Appendix R also 
presents the results with two alternative measures of land concentration: the percentage of 
arable land in holdings greater than 200 hectares in 1962, and a Gini index of land 
concentration in 1970.  
7.2. Other Potential Intervening Factors 
The rate of Reconquest could also affect other factors of relevance to economic 
development. A first candidate is the extent to which the preexisting Muslim population was 
respected and integrated into the Christian kingdoms. A rapid frontier expansion made it 
difficult to govern and integrate this population, as became apparent with the great mudejar 
revolt of 1264, which led to the expulsion of the Muslim population from the Guadalquivir 
Valley. In addition to creating problems of labor scarcity, the fate of the Muslim population 
had important implications due to their higher human capital, particularly concerning the 
level of agricultural technology.46 Moreover, the degree of assimilation of the Muslim 
population could also have cultural implications. Indeed, Chaney and Hornbeck (2015) 
                                                 
44 We proceed in this way because military orders were mostly composed of members of the nobility, with 
masters (maestres) and commanders usually forming part of the higher nobility (Vicens Vives 1969; Mestre-
Campi and Sabaté 1998; Alvarez-Palenzuela 2002). 
45 We consider this as a clear-cut proxy for historical structural inequality, which is referred to as a type of 
inequality that is historical in the sense that has exhibited high persistence over centuries, and structural in the 
sense that it is a class-based inequality that measures the relative size of the landless workers class relative to 
land owners and tenants. In an agrarian economy where land is a major factor of production, if landownership 
is highly concentrated, broad segments of the population have to work for landlords, earning low wages and 
living in miserable conditions. This was indeed the situation for a broad mass of the population in large estates 
regions. 
46 al-Andalus, the unique Muslim domain in Western Europe, achieved by far the highest level of prosperity on 
the continent (Chejne 1999). Its economy was based on a developed and partially irrigated agriculture, a 
significant arts and crafts industry and flourishing trade. Furthermore, a monetary system was in place, 
contrasting with the primitive economy of the northern Christian kingdoms (Vicens Vives 1969, Glick 1979). 
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document differences between Christians and Muslims in their preference for child quality 
vs. quantity (Galor and Moav, 2002), as well as in fertility and mortality (Galor and Weil, 
1996). To measure this factor, the best we can do is use an indicator of the proportion of 
Moorish ancestry in the current population of each province. Using an admixture approach 
based on binary and Y-STR haplotypes, Adams et al. (2008) were able to identify the 
genetic differentiation of the population of the Iberian Peninsula and the Balearic Islands, 
finding a relatively high mean proportion of ancestry from North Africa (10.6%). As 
opposed to the common expectation that a South-North gradient of North-African ancestry 
is followed, it is worth noting that the highest proportions of Moorish ancestry (greater than 
20%) are found in Galicia and Northwest Castile, which contrast with the much lower 
proportions in Andalusia.47 
A second potential channel through which the Reconquest might affect current 
development is the traditional family type distribution. Tur-Prats (2015) finds that those 
areas featuring traditional stem families, in which one son inherits all the land and cohabits 
the parental home along with his wife to continue the family line, are associated with lower 
IPV and greater gender equality. This contrasts with the higher IPV found in those areas in 
which nuclear families –whereby all children receive an equal share of the inheritance and 
leave the parental home to constitute independent households– are more prevalent. 
According to Tur-Prats (2015), stem families were dominant in the North because the early 
stages of the Reconquest gave rise to small and medium-size landholdings, which were 
preserved by free families through indivisible inheritance. However, as the Reconquest 
advanced further South, military orders and nobility were awarded with vast tracts of land, 
and the landless peasantry had no choice but to comply with the equal inheritance rules 
mandated by Castilian Law, thus giving rise to nuclear families. Therefore, the traditional 
family type mechanism may be confused with those related to the concentration of political 
power in the hands of the nobility or even to the extent of land inequality. We investigate 
the validity of this channel by measuring the historical distribution of family types through 
the average number of married and widowed women per household at province level from 
the 1860 census, as in Tur-Prats (2015). 
A third possible mechanism that may affect current levels of development is the degree of 
market fragmentation. Grafe (2012) points to the exceptionally high degree of market 
fragmentation observed in Spain over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as the main 
                                                 
47 It is also worth mentioning the marked differences between the western part of Spain, with a relatively high 
proportion, and the eastern part with a relatively low proportion. Adams et al. (2008) seek to explain these 
differences in the history of enforced relocation and expulsion of the Moorish population.  
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obstacle to economic development. In addition, market fragmentation could be the 
consequence –at least in part– of accelerated colonization by, for instance, making it more 
difficult to maintain the pre-existing infrastructure network. We measure differences in the 
degree of market fragmentation across provinces by constructing an indicator of road 
density in 1760 at provincial level, with higher road density implying less fragmented 
markets. This indicator can also be used to test for possible differences in government 
investment in infrastructure across provinces. 
One might also assume that the Reconquest generated historical differences both in the 
political power of the Church and in religiosity across provinces, which might have had 
some effect on current development. To control for this factor, we employ two indicators 
measured at the end of the eighteenth century: the percentage of population entities under 
Church jurisdiction, and the percentage of population that was a member of the clergy (both 
secular and regular). A related factor is the role played by the Inquisition, which was 
charged with preserving Catholic orthodoxy. Vidal-Robert (2014) shows that inquisitorial 
activity is negatively associated both with urbanization rates at regional level and population 
growth at municipal level. However, a lack of consistent data for constructing an indicator 
for the majority of the Spanish provinces has prevented us from empirically assessing the 
role of the Inquisition in mediating the effect of the Reconquest. 
Another mechanism that remains uncontrolled involves interregional migration, which is 
historically hard to measure. However, there may be reasons explaining why people do not 
move between regions to arbitrate the existing differences in economic development. One 
simple explanation may be found in Gennaioli et al. (2013, 2014), who develop a model in 
which there are frictions related to the limited supply of land and housing that prevent 
people from completely arbitrating away the differences in income. Besides, migration in 
our case would act against our identification strategy, since if income differences were 
swept away because of interregional migration, we would no longer find an effect on current 
income differences, which would have vanished over time. 
Finally, the rapid advance of the Christian frontier gave rise to sparsely populated 
territories due to a lack of manpower and settlers, which was aggravated by the eventual 
expulsion of the conquered population. However, strictly speaking, population density 
cannot be considered a channel to the extent that in a Malthusian regime it is strongly 
correlated with output per capita. Indeed, Chaney and Hornbeck (2015) provide evidence 
that early modern Spain was subjected to Malthusian dynamics after the Moriscos expulsion 
in 1609. Labor-scarce areas also gave rise to the creation of latifundia and shifts from grain 
to cash crops cultivation. An additional empirical problem is that it is impossible to 
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distinguish which part of the effect of population density on current development works 
through political power concentration or the creation of large estates, or through other 
mechanisms such as agglomeration economies or technological progress à la Boserup. 
The consistency between these alternative potential mechanisms and the observed timing 
of the effect of the Reconquest is theoretically less compelling than the case of the channel 
of structural inequality. Indeed, if the lack of agglomeration economies due to low 
population density, human capital depreciation derived from the expulsion of the Muslims, 
market fragmentation, and differences in religiosity were relevant factors explaining the 
effect of the Reconquest, the timing of the effect should have been much earlier, instead of 
much later during industrialization. 
7.3. Empirical Analysis 
Although the timing of the effect of the Reconquest provides some clues about the 
empirical validity of the proposed channels, we next analyze this question more 
systematically. For a variable to be a candidate for a channel, it needs to be correlated not 
only with the rate of Reconquest, but also with log GDP per capita. In addition, the effect of 
the rate of Reconquest needs to work via that particular channel. This is implemented 
through a 2SLS analysis that uses the rate of Reconquest to predict the channel variable in 
the first stage, and then regresses log GDP per capita in 2005 on the predicted channel 
variable, in both stages controlling for the baseline control set. The first and second stages 
are presented in Panel B and A of Table 7, respectively. Panel C reports the OLS regression 
of GDP per capita on the channel variable, which enables us to determine whether the 
selected channels have a large explanatory power for explaining current output levels, as 
occurred with rate of Reconquest in the reduced-form estimations. It should be pointed out 
that, strictly speaking, this 2SLS analysis does not represent an instrumental variables 
estimation.  
As shown in Panel B, rate of Reconquest is positively correlated at conventional 
significance levels with the sources of structural inequality: land inequality as measured by 
the percentage of landless workers in 1797 and 1956, and the concentration of political 
power in the hands of the nobility as measured by noble jurisdictions in 1787. This is 
consistent with the fact that the faster a territory was reconquered, the more likely it was that 
the nobility was granted large estates and jurisdictional rights. Besides this channel, there is 
also evidence that a greater rate of Reconquest is significantly associated with a lower 
prevalence of population entities under the jurisdiction of the Church. This is because the 
concentration of economic and political power did not move hand in hand for the Church 
and the nobility. As widely documented in Spanish historiography, the clergy was important 
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during the first two centuries of the Reconquest, whereas in the later stages of the 
Reconquest this power shifted to the nobility and military orders. This explains why the 
contribution of the Church to the repopulation of southern Spain was marginal compared to 
that of the other powerful groups. The reason for this must be sought in the opposition of the 
nobility to the acquisition of jurisdictional rights by the Church, because of the greater 
involvement of the former in the occupation and defense of frontier lands (Artola et al., 
1978). 
The second stage in Panel A shows that higher land inequality and a more unequal 
distribution of jurisdictional rights in the hands of the nobility are associated with lower 
current development. In addition, church jurisdiction is positively correlated with current 
GDP, which might be explained by the positive impact the Church may have had on the 
early spread of literacy. However, when we regress the literacy rate in 1860 on the 
percentage of population entities under church jurisdiction, after controlling for our baseline 
control set, there is no evidence to support the existence of a statistically significant positive 
link between both variables. 
If we add to this the fact that i) there is no statistically significant relationship between 
church jurisdiction and GDP per capita in 2005 in the OLS regressions in Panel C,48 and ii) 
the other religiosity indicator (percentage of population that was a member of the clergy) 
does not enter significantly in any of the estimation stages, we can to some extent rule out 
the empirical validity of the religiosity channel. Table 7 also provides consistent evidence 
across both estimation stages that other channels such as stem family prevalence, Moorish 
ancestry or historical road density are statistically insignificant. With the evidence at hand, 
this suggests that the traditional family type, the degree of integration of the Muslim 
population or their higher human capital concerning the level of agricultural technology, and 
market fragmentation are not relevant mechanisms explaining the long-term economic 
consequences of the Reconquest. In contrast, structural inequality, caused by high inequality 
in the access to a historical production factor like land and a high concentration of political 
power in the hands of the landowning nobility, appears to be the dominant channel through 
which the Reconquest affected current development.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
7.4. Outcome Indicators at the Onset of Industrialization 
                                                 
48 In contrast, the partial R2 of the structural inequality measures (0.23 for landless workers in 1797, 0.45 for 
landless workers in 1956 and 0.29 for noble jurisdictions) is comparable to the partial R2 of rate of Reconquest 
(Table 2, column 1), which equals 0.35. 
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The evidence presented in this section largely supports the view that structural inequality 
plays a central role in explaining the Reconquest’s effect and why it became apparent during 
the era of industrialization. Table 8 provides additional evidence consistent with this 
hypothesis by focusing on the decisive moment in which Spain began industrializing. It is 
expected that some of the fundamentals of modern economic growth needed for 
industrialization to succeed were also undermined at the onset of the industrialization 
period. This is because such factors as a deficient education and health care precluded the 
broad majority of the population from participating in economic activity in those regions 
with an unequal distribution of land and political power.  
Our dependent variables are a number of factors that are relevant for economic growth, all 
measured in the 1860s. They are two indicators related to education (literacy rate and school 
enrollment), two related to health (infant mortality and life expectancy), two associated with 
political participation (percentage of electors and voters), and two indicators related to 
social conflict (criminality and convicts). According to our view, we expect the rate of 
Reconquest –working through structural inequality– to lead to lower human capital 
(negatively affecting education and health), lower political participation, and higher social 
conflict.49 This is precisely what we observe in Panel A of Table 8 that presents a 2SLS 
analysis that traces the effect of the rate of Reconquest on outcomes in 1860 through the 
channel of structural inequality measured via our preferred indicator given by the 
percentage of landless workers in 1797. Similar results are obtained with the OLS estimates 
of the reduced-form effect of the rate of Reconquest on outcomes in 1860 (Panel B of Table 
8).50 All in all, the evidence provided in Table 8 indicates that around 1860 historically 
rooted inequality had already created the conditions for the subsequent failure to 
industrialize. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
8. Conclusions 
The legacy of history appears particularly pervasive in the case of Spain. This paper shows 
the Reconquest in the Middle Ages to have been a major historical process shaping the 
distribution of regional income. The rate of Reconquest, which captures the magnitude of 
the colonization effort required in the period when each one of what are now today’s 
                                                 
49 Regarding political participation, it is important to note that at that time a limited suffrage system based on 
capacity and fiscal criteria was in place. 
50 The negative impact of a low level of human capital appears in line with the evidence provided by Maloney 
and Valencia (2014) on the lack of technical capacity of former Spanish colonies at the time of 
industrialization, which emanate from the deficient technological capacity in the metropolis. They could also 
reflect inherited cultural and institutional factors, intrinsic to peninsular society organization.  
35 
provinces was conquered by the Christians, has a robust and strong negative effect on 
current income. Our results are robust to controlling for historical controls and a wide array 
of climatic, geographic and natural resource endowments that account for simple and 
sophisticated versions of the geography hypothesis. Of particular interest is the lack of a 
significant effect due to differences in land suitability for plantation crops featuring 
economies of scale in production. Moreover, the effect of the rate of Reconquest survives 
the inclusion of latitude, log distances from key industrial centers, and several other 
methods to deal with the North-South gradient issue. The results also remain unaltered when 
employing several alternative indicators of the Reconquest. A municipality-level analysis 
that includes province-level fixed effects also provides evidence supporting the existence of 
a negative effect of the rate of Reconquest on economic development. In addition, a number 
of falsification tests indicate that the rate of Reconquest is not associated with indicators of 
pre-Reconquest economic development. 
We argue that a rapid rate of Reconquest led to imperfect colonization, mainly 
characterized by a high concentration of power in a few hands. The evidence supports the 
view that a fast frontier expansion favored a political equilibrium biased toward the military 
elite (i.e., the nobility), which generated a high concentration of economic and political 
power, thus creating the conditions that led to the exclusion of large segments of the 
population from participating in the economic opportunities that opened up with the arrival 
of industrialization. The result was that provinces featuring an unequal distribution of 
economic and political power fell behind during the industrialization period. Thus, the 
Reconquest set in motion processes that generated persistent inequality, constituting a 
severe impediment to the requirements for modern economic growth, which is based on 
entrepreneurship, innovation, and the participation in economic activity of broad segments 
of the population. 
Our results contribute to the novel literature on the political-economic effects of frontier 
expansions in that the existence of a large frontier that needs to be occupied and defended 
from the enemy may lead to a shift in the balance of power toward dominant groups, which 
may create the conditions for an inegalitarian society, with negative consequences for long-
term development. This study of the Spanish Reconquest is also appealing from the point of 
view of the literature on colonialism, because it gives clues about the colonization of the 
New World. When Spain colonized Central and South America in the sixteenth century, it 
had the long experience gathered in the Reconquest. The policy of distributing economic 
power in the form of large estates, as well as of political power in the form of feudal rights, 
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as applied in Spain since the mid-eleventh century (becoming widespread as of the 
thirteenth century) is a foretaste of what would later be implemented in the New World. 
Finally, a question that deserves further research is why the effect of the Reconquest 
resulting from the pattern of colonization of the conquered lands is so persistent, even 
though today some sources of this problem are no longer present. The early obstruction of 
industrialization may have long-lasting consequences. Historical, economic, and political 
inequality may have affected the initial paths of industrialization and development and, once 
launched, different economic forces (e.g., increasing returns) reproduce the initial 
divergence. In addition, many social and cultural patterns developed in the past due to a 
high concentration of economic and political power may still persist today. 
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(19) -0.016*** 0,000 0,27 45 (37) -0.017*** 0.009 0,3 45
(0.004) (0.000) (0.004) (0.005)
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2005
Climatic, geographic and topographic factors (Continued)(1)
(2)
(3)
Land suitability for 
cotton
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Coal output in 1860
Soil quality
Arable land 1962 
(%)
Land suitability for 
sugar
Coal dummy in 
1860
Notes : Variables descriptions are provided in Table 9. The estimations include a constant term, which is omitted for space considerations.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
Humidity
Agric. land 1900 
(%)
E: Natural resources endowments
Latitude
Ln distance from 
LondonTemperature
Ln distance from 
ParisRainfall
Ln distance from 
Mainz
(12)
Centuries under 
Muslim domination
Distance to the 
coast
Crown of Aragon
Border with 
Portugal
Madrid
Ln distance from 
Madrid
(9)
IslandUrban population 
density at conquest
Coast DummyAv. urban pop.dens. at 
conquest in the 
Christian kingdom
Coast length/ 
surface area
C: Climatic, geographic and topographic factors
(8)
(10)
Mediterranean SeaYears since transition 
to agriculture
Atlantic OceanRoman roads density
Cantabrian Sea
D: Geographic controls related to transportation costs
Urban population 
density in 800
TABLE 1 - THE EFFECT OF THE RECONQUEST ON CURRENT DEVELOPMENT
A: Basic relationship
Land suitability for 
tobacco
50 provinces
Average altitude Initial resistance 
provinces removed
RuggednessB:  Neolithic and Historical controls
(11)
Wooded steppe (% 
area)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Rate of Reconquest x 1500 -5.909 -6.235 -6.003 -5.788 -5.977 -7.553* -6.444*
(3.714) (3.976) (3.775) (3.581) (3.731) (4.243) (3.711)
Rate of Reconquest x 1600 -3.066 -3.506 -3.107 -2.959 -3.316 -3.354 -2.543
(4.35) (4.553) (4.418) (4.221) (4.272) (4.75) (4.145)
Rate of Reconquest x 1700 -2.969 -3.496 -2.994 -2.831 -3.078 -8.95** -8.67**
(3.963) (4.092) (4.023) (3.794) (3.984) (4.295) (3.799)
Rate of Reconquest x 1800 -4.852 -5.531 -4.779 -4.764 -4.843 -7.169* -6.383*
(4.114) (4.296) (4.179) (4.07) (4.03) (4.314) (3.761)
Rate of Reconquest x 1860 -8.772** -9.015** -8.807** -8.694** -8.985** -9.558** -8.992**
(4.219) (4.41) (4.283) (4.199) (4.272) (4.605) (4.209)
Rate of Reconquest x 1930 -10.704** -10.602** -10.568** -10.647** -10.893** -10.729** -10.126**
(4.388) (4.587) (4.45) (4.359) (4.455) (4.876) (4.516)
Rate of Reconquest x 1971 -11.427** -11.345** -11.333** -11.37** -11.65** -11.749** -11.222**
(4.432) (4.632) (4.498) (4.405) (4.523) (4.938) (4.623)
Rate of Reconquest x 2005 -11.578** -11.392** -11.438** -11.517** -11.825** -11.809** -11.201**
(4.504) (4.709) (4.571) (4.483) (4.599) (4.989) (4.69)
Soil quality x 1500 31.948 25.517
(54.612) (62.613)
Soil quality x 1600 43.09 104.393*
(45.431) (55.469)
Soil quality x 1700 52.816 114.882*
(49.942) (64.916)
Soil quality x 1800 66.491 55.14
(55.036) (53.235)
Soil quality x 1860 23.808 57.826
(37.686) (42.02)
Soil quality x 1930 -9.987 41.931
(42.224) (44.843)
Soil quality x 1971 -8.008 39.03
(48.579) (46.537)
Soil quality x 2005 -18.209 37.29
(47.651) (46.223)
Cantabrian Sea x 1500 -29.85 -48.103**
(18.265) (20.271)
Cantabrian Sea x 1600 -12.993 -18.857
(17.259) (20.639)
Cantabrian Sea x 1700 -8.133 -7.358
(20.11) (23.483)
Cantabrian Sea x 1800 23.464 34.465
(17.792) (23.214)
Cantabrian Sea x 1860 -11.039 -26.48
(14.349) (18.653)
Cantabrian Sea x 1930 43.438*** 28.183
(14.651) (18.867)
Cantabrian Sea x 1971 30.061* 9.296
(16.008) (20.429)
Cantabrian Sea x 2005 44.398*** 19.369
(16.756) (20.179)
TABLE 6 - THE TIMING OF THE EFFECT OF THE RECONQUEST: REGRESSION RESULTS
Dependent variable is relative economic development
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Coal dummy x 1500 -113.56* -113.245
(64.287) (71.216)
Coal dummy x 1600 -100.617 -113.076
(69.542) (75.572)
Coal dummy x 1700 -121.453* -99.208
(65.849) (75.383)
Coal dummy x 1800 -83.408 -73.803
(67.76) (71.808)
Coal dummy x 1860 -73.736 -77.859
(70.205) (76.87)
Coal dummy x 1930 -53.86 -60.038
(69.974) (77.255)
Coal dummy x 1971 -54.326 -58.63
(72.032) (78.675)
Coal dummy x 2005 -57.369 -62.378
(73.097) (79.222)
Medit. Sea x 1500 -31.845 -34.051
(39.245) (40.195)
Medit. Sea x 1600 -116.079*** -123.746***
(34.231) (36.126)
Medit. Sea x 1700 -50.973 -67.883*
(38.892) (40.737)
Medit. Sea x 1800 4.312 3.466
(39.13) (41.477)
Medit. Sea x 1860 -98.873*** -103.19***
(31.005) (31.858)
Medit. Sea x 1930 -87.314** -89.485**
(35.455) (35.861)
Medit. Sea x 1971 -103.266*** -105.595***
(37.208) (37.917)
Medit. Sea x 2005 -114.678*** -116.691***
(37.632) (38.301)
Log distance to Paris x 1500 68.031 7.019
(65.059) (65.007)
Log distance to Paris x 1600 11.918 -74.258
(39.758) (56.2)
Log distance to Paris x 1700 253.596*** 191.423*
(92.992) (115.862)
Log distance to Paris x 1800 95.866** 48.07
(37.056) (45.256)
Log distance to Paris x 1860 32.496 -24.559
(35.486) (42.461)
Log distance to Paris x 1930 1.018 -43.337
(51.557) (56.476)
Log distance to Paris x 1971 13.333 -30.611
(58.984) (60.369)
Log distance to Paris x 2005 9.594 -36.495
(56.436) (57.987)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R 2 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.4 0.39 0.42
Number of observations 538 538 538 538 538 538 538
Notes : Panel specifications that regress each province’s level of development relative to the national average over
the 1000-2005 period on the interaction between rate of Reconquest and time dummies, with data measured at the
beginning of each century up to 1800, and then at 1860, 1930, 1970 and 2005. For the periods prior to 1860 for which
there are no available data on GDP per capita, we employ density of urban population. Variables descriptions are
provided in Table 9. The estimations include a constant term, which is omitted for space considerations. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. Small-sample correction for standard errors is applied. *, ** and *** denote
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
TABLE 6 - THE TIMING OF THE EFFECT OF THE RECONQUEST: REGRESSION RESULTS (CONTINUED )
Dependent variable is relative economic development
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Percentage of 
landless 
workers 1797
Percentage of 
landless 
workers 1956
Percentage of 
population entities 
under seigneurial 
jurisdiction in 1787
Family types Moorish ancestry
Market 
fragmentation 
(Road density in 
1760)
Percentage of 
population entities 
under Church 
jurisdiction in 1787
Religiosity 
(Clerical 
population in 
1797)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-0.009*** -0.008*** -0.010** 25.689 0.014 -78.654 0.034** -85.605
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (44.709) (0.011) (158.623) (0.015) (64.005)
Geo-climatic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standardized beta -0,770 -0,694 -0,750 8,385 0,506 -4,057 1,687 -1,536
1.683*** 1.915*** 1.58** -0.001 -0.456 0,000 -0.461** 0,000
(0.402) (0.473) (0.696) (0.001) (0.277) (0.000) (0.181) (0.000)
F-Statistic 17,53 16,41 5,15 0,37 2,71 0,24 6,47 1,67
Partial R 2 0,327 0,355 0,116 0,006 0,077 0,006 0,074 0,077
Geo-climatic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standardized beta 0,514 0,567 0,393 -0,084 -0,334 0,000 -0,231 0,000
R 2 0,70 0,68 0,36 0,78 0,60 0,47 0,64 0,61
Number of observations 45 45 45 45 43 45 45 45
Panel C: OLS regressions of Log GDP pc 2005 on the channel variable
-0.004** -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.178 0.005* -1.814 0.003 -9.355
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.565) (0.003) (2.162) (0.002) (7.905)
Geo-climatic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standardized beta -0,408 -0,631 -0,375 -0,066 0,213 -0,137 0,186 -0,215
R 2 0,72 0,80 0,74 0,63 0,82 0,64 0,65 0,65
Number of observations 45 45 45 45 43 45 45 45
Panel A: Second stage (Log GDP pc 2005 regressed on the predicted values of the channel variable)
Panel B: First stage (The channel variable regressed on rate of Reconquest)
Rate of Reconquest
Notes : Variables descriptions are provided in Table 9. All the estimations include the control set employed in the baseline specification (column 1, Table 2) and a constant
term, which are omitted for space considerations. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Small-sample correction for standard errors is applied in 2SLS regressions. *,
** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. The respective standardized beta coefficients are reported in the bottom part of each panel.
TABLE 7 - MECHANISMS AT WORK
The channel variable →
The channel variable
The channel variable
 
 
Literacy 
rate 
School 
enrollment
Infant 
mortality
Life 
expectancy
Percentage of 
electors
Percentage of 
voters Crimes Convicts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-0.32** -0.002* 0.64 -0.15** -0.001*** -0.001* 0.037*** 0.03***
(0.141) (0.001) (0.64) (0.064) (0.00) (0.00) (0.013) (0.01)
Geo-climatic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standardized beta -0,515 -0,398 0,229 -0,488 -0,549 -0,764 0,656 0,712
-0.539*** -0.003** 1.078 -0.253** -0.002*** -0.001* 0.062*** 0.05***
(0.182) (0.001) (1.074) (0.111) (0.00) (0.00) (0.022) (0.013)
Geo-climatic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standardized beta -0,316 -0,218 0,140 -0,299 -0,400 -0,278 0,400 0,432
R 2 0,77 0,74 0,58 0,66 0,64 0,51 0,57 0,63
Number of observations 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
Panel A: 2SLS results (The outcome indicator regressed on the predicted value of the percentage of landless workers in 1797)
Percentage of landless 
workers 1797
Panel B: Reduced-form effect (The outcome indicator regressed on rate of Reconquest)
Rate of Reconquest
Notes : Variables descriptions are provided in Table 9. All the estimations include the control set employed in the baseline specification
(column 1, Table 2) and a constant term, which are omitted for space considerations. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Small-sample
correction for standard errors is applied in 2SLS regressions. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. The
respective standardized beta coefficients are reported in the bottom part of each panel.
TABLE 8 - OUTCOMES INDICATORS IN THE 1860s
The outcome indicator in 
the 1860s →
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Figure 1. The Spanish Reconquest (711-1492)
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Figure 2. Conditional relationship between current GDP per capita and rate of  Reconquest 
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Appendix 
See Table 9. 
Variable Description Source
Main dependent variable
Log GDP per capita in 2005 Natural logarithm of GDP per capita  in 2005. Spanish Regional Accounts. Base 
2000 (Spanish National Statistics 
Institute, INE).
Reconquest indicators
Rate of Reconquest This variable is created (using ArcGIS) as follows. We overlap the Reconquest
map from Mestre-Campi and Sabaté (1998) with a geo-referenced map of the
Spanish provinces. We also overlap a map of the initial resistance area
(http://explorethemed.com/Reconquista.asp) with the map of Spanish provinces.
We then draw the lines of each stage of the Reconquest as well as a line
separating Castile and Aragon. We calculate the surface area corresponding to
each stage of the Reconquest for Castile and Aragon (9 stages for Castile and 7
for Aragon). Regarding the initial area of resistance in northern Spain, since it
was not effectively conquered by the Muslims and, therefore, not reconquered,
we exclude it from the baseline analysis. Next, we divide the reconquered area in
each stage by the duration in years that each stage lasted for, thus obtaining a
measure of the rate of Reconquest. Since the area of a province can partially
cover more than one stage of the Reconquest, we calculate its area within each of
the respective stages. We then compute the weighted average of the rate of
Reconquest of each province, where the weights are given by the percentage of
the province area conquered in each stage. The variable is expressed in 100
km2/year.
Authors’ elaboration using 
information from Mestre-Campi 
and Sabaté (1998).
Rate of Reconquest 
corresponding to the 
provincial centroid
An alternative indicator of rate of Reconquest that assigns to each province the
rate of Reconquest corresponding to the Reconquest stage in which a province’s
geographic centroid is located.
Authors’ elaboration using 
information from Mestre-Campi 
and Sabaté (1998).
Stages of Reconquest with 
homogeneous time interval
This indicator is calculated as follows: (i) Provinces are classified according to
the century in which they were reconquered. In this way, the Reconquest is
divided into stages of the same duration. The five Cantabrian provinces not
occupied by the Muslims are considered separately, with a value equal to 0. (ii)
For each century, we compute the total land area reconquered in that period,
differentiating between the areas conquered by Castile and Aragon. (iii) Then,
the rate of Reconquest in a given province is the total land area that was
reconquered in the century in which that province was reconquered, expressed in
100 km2/year. 
Authors’ elaboration using 
information from Mestre-Campi 
and Sabaté (1998).
Post-1212 conquest Dummy variable indicating whether the province was reconquered after the
collapse of the Almohad Empire in 1212 in the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa.
Authors’ elaboration using 
information from Mestre-Campi 
and Sabaté (1998) and Guichard 
(2002), among others.
Controls
Agricultural land in 1900 
(%)
Percentage of agricultural area over provincial surface area in 1900. Barciela et al. (2005).
Arable land in 1962 (%) Percentage of arable land over total surface area in 1962. 1962 agricultural census (INE) 
(www.ine.es).
Average altitude Average altitude of the province (simple average of the municipalities of the
province)
Geographic Nomenclature of 
Municipalities and Local 
Population (Instituto Geográfico 
Nacional -IGN- 2012).
TABLE 9 - DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES (I)
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Variable Description Source
Controls (continued)
Average urban population 
density at conquest in the 
Christian kingdom
Average density of urban population (inhabitants in cities greater than or equal to 
5000 inhabitants over provincial surface area in km2) in Castile or Aragon just
before the conquest of the province.
Authors’ elaboration using 
information from Bairoch (1988).
Border with Portugal Dummy variable indicating whether the province is in the border with Portugal. Authors’ elaboration.
Centuries under Muslim 
domination
Number of centuries that the province was under Muslim domination. It is
calculated as the closest integer to the difference between the year of the
Reconquest of the capital city of the province and the date of the Muslim
invasion (711).
Authors’ elaboration using 
information from Mestre-Campi 
and Sabaté (1998) and Guichard 
(2002), among others.
Coal dummy in 1860 Dummy variable indicating whether the province had some coal mine in 1860. 1860-1861 Statistical Yearbook 
of Spain (Junta General de 
Estadística -JGE- 1863a).
Coal output in 1860 Logarithm of the value created by coal mining in 1860. 1860-1861 Statistical Yearbook 
of Spain (JGE 1863a).
Coast dummy Dummy variable indicating whether the province has coast. Authors’ elaboration.
Coast length/ surface area Length of coast over surface area. Physical variables. Territory 
(INE) (www.ine.es).
Crown of Aragon Dummy variable capturing whether the province belonged to the Crown of
Aragon.
Authors’ elaboration.
Distance from London, Paris 
and Mainz
Natural logarithm of the linear distance between the centroid of the province and
London, Paris or Mainz (in 100 km), using ArcGIS.
Authors’ elaboration.
Distance from Madrid Natural logarithm of the linear distance between the centroid of the province and
Madrid (in 100 km), using ArcGIS.
Authors’ elaboration.
Distance to the coast Linear distance between the centroid of the province and the nearest point of the
coast (in 100 km), using ArcGIS. For the three provinces that are islands, this
variable takes the value of 0.
Authors’ elaboration.
Humidity, Temperature and 
Rainfall
Annual average temperature, rainfall and relative humidity. Standard Climate Values 
(Agencia Estatal de Meteorología 
2012).
Island Dummy variable indicating whether the province is an island. Authors’ elaboration.
Latitude Latitude of the centroid of the province, using ArcGIS. Authors’ elaboration.
Land suitability for cotton Provincial average of the crop suitability index for low input level rain-fed
cotton.
Authors’ elaboration using data 
from FAO/IIASA (2010).
Land suitability for sugar Provincial average of the crop suitability index for low input level rain-fed
sugarcane.
Authors’ elaboration using data 
from FAO/IIASA (2010).
Land suitability for tobacco Provincial average of the crop suitability index for low input level rain-fed
tobacco.
Authors’ elaboration using data 
from FAO/IIASA (2010).
Madrid Dummy variable indicating the capital city of Spain. Authors’ elaboration.
Mediterranean Sea, Atlantic 
Ocean, Cantabrian Sea
Dummy variables indicating whether the province has access to the
Mediterranean Sea, the Atlantic Ocean or the Cantabrian Sea.
Authors’ elaboration.
Roman roads density Length of Roman roads (in meters) over provincial surface area (in km2). Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and data from García de 
Cortázar (2007).
Ruggedness Coefficient of variation of the altitude of the municipalities of the province. Geographic Nomenclature of 
Municipalities and Local 
Population (Instituto Geográfico 
Nacional -IGN- 2012).
TABLE 9 - DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES (II)
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Variable Description Source
Controls (continued)
Soil quality Average of seven key soil dimensions important for crop production: nutrient
availability, nutrient retention capacity, rooting conditions, oxygen availability to
roots, excess salts, toxicities, and workability. For each component, we calculate
the provincial average value.
Authors’ elaboration using data 
from Fischer et al. (2008).
Urban population density in 
800
Density of urban population (inhabitants in cities greater than or equal to 5000
inhabitants over provincial surface area in km2) in 800.
Bairoch (1988).
Urban population density at 
conquest
Density of urban population (inhabitants in cities greater than or equal to 5000
inhabitants over provincial surface area in km2) in the latest available date
previous to the conquest of the province by the Christians.
Authors’ elaboration using 
information from Bairoch (1988).
Wooded steppe (% area) Percentage of province area that was subject to wooded steppe 10,000 years ago. Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and information from 
Olsson and Paik (2013).
Years since transition to 
agriculture
This variable is constructed for each province using the following equation:
Y(S 0 )=Σ λi Y(S i ), where Y(S 0 ) is the predicted date of adoption of agriculture
for the centroid of each respective province (denoted by S 0 ). Σ means a sum
from site 1 to N, where N is the number of measured sample points surrounding
S 0 . We restrict the measured sample points to those located in the Iberian
Peninsula that make a total of 13 Neolithic sites. Y(S i ) is the observed value of
the predicted date of early adoption of agriculture in Neolithic site S i . λi are
weights calculated as λi= (D/d i )/Σ(D/d i ), where Σ λi = 1 and d i is the distance
between S 0 and each Neolithic site S i . D = Σd i is the total sum of the 13 d i for
the centroid of each respective province (S 0 ). Note that (D/d i ) implies that we
assign greater weights to those sites located closer to the centroid of each
province.
Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and data from Pinhasi, 
Fort and Ammerman (2005).
Variables of pre-Reconquest development (not described above)
Ancient settlements over 
surface area
Number of ancient (pre-medieval) settlements over provincial surface area (in
1,000 km2).
Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and data from Pleiades 
(2014).
City population in 800 Inhabitants (in thousands) in cities greater than or equal to 5000 inhabitants in
800.
Bairoch (1988).
Coinage of imperial Roman 
coins over surface area
Number of points of coinage of imperial Roman coins over provincial surface
area (in 1,000 km2).
Authors’ elaboration using data 
from García de Cortázar (2007).
Number of bishoprics circa 
600 over surface area
Number of bishoprics circa 600 over provincial surface area (in 1,000 km2). Authors’ elaboration using data 
from Digital Atlas of Roman and 
Medieval Civilizations v. 1.1.
Roman roads density: Main 
roads
Length of the main Roman roads (in meters) over provincial surface area (in
km2).
Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and data from García de 
Cortázar (2007).
Roman villas over surface 
area
Number of Roman villas over provincial surface area (in 1,000 km2). Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and data from Pleiades 
(2014).
TABLE 9 - DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES (III)
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Variable Description Source
Variables used in the balancedness table (not described above)
Urbanization levels (Density 
of urban population): 800-
1850
Density of urban population (inhabitants in cities greater than or equal to 5000
inhabitants over provincial surface area in km2).
Bairoch (1988).
Agricultural output per km2 
in 1860
Agricultural output in 1860 divided by total surface area. Authors’ elaboration from Rosés 
et al. (2010).
Agricultural output per capita 
in 1860
Agricultural output in 1860 divided by total population. Authors’ elaboration from Rosés 
et al. (2010) and the 1860 
population census (JGE 1863b).
Agricultural productivity in 
1860
Agricultural output in 1860 divided by the number of male agricultural workers. Authors’ elaboration from Rosés 
et al. (2010), Erdozáin and 
Mikelarena (1999), and the 1860 
population census (JGE 1863b).
Agricultural share over GDP 
(%) in 1860
Agricultural output in 1860 divided by total provincial output. Rosés et al. (2010).
Productive land (%) in 1900 Percentage of productive land over provincial surface area in 1900. Barciela et al. (2005).
Wheat output per hectare in 
1916
Volume of wheat output (in Spanish bushels) per hectare in 1916. 1916 Statistical Yearbook of 
Spain (INE).
Agricultural output per ha in 
1950
Agricultural output (average 1949-1951) (in pesetas) over provincial surface area
(in ha).
García Barbancho (1954).
Variables Used in Section VI on the Timing of the Effects (not described above)
Relative GDP per capita in 
1860, 1930, 1971 and 2005.
Relative GDP per capita with respect to the Spanish average, in 1860, 1930,
1971, and 2005.
Rosés et al (2010) for 1860 and 
1930; Carreras et al. (2005) for 
1971; and Spanish Regional 
Accounts. Base 2000 (INE) for 
2005.
Relative industrial output 
per capita in 1860, 1930, 
1970 and 2005.
Relative industrial output per capita with respect to the Spanish average, in
1860, 1930, 1971, and 2005.
Rosés et al. (2010) for 1860; 
Carreras (2005) for 1930 and 
1970; Spanish Regional 
Accounts. Base 2000 (INE) for 
2005.
Total UK industrial output Total industrial output of the United Kingdom in 1860, 1930, 1971 and 2005.
Base year is 1913.
Mitchell (2007a) and IMF (2013).
Total US industrial output Total industrial output of the United States in 1860, 1930, 1971 and 2005. Base
year is 1899.
Mitchell (2007b) and IMF (2013).
Variables used as mechanisms
Family types Average number of married and widowed women per household at provincelevel.
1860 population census (JGE 
1863b).
Moorish ancestry Proportion of Moorish ancestry in the current population of each province. Adams et al. (2008).
Religiosity (Clerical 
population in 1797)
Percentage of population that is member of the clergy (both secular and regular)
in 1797. We impute data from historical regions to current provinces by
estimating (with ArcGIS) the percentage of area in each province that
corresponds to each historical region.
Authors’ elaboration using data 
from Morales (1998)  and 1797 
population census (INE, 1992).
Land concentration in 1962 Percentage of arable land in holdings greater than 200 hectares, measured in
1962.
1962 agricultural census (INE).
Land Gini Index in 1972 Gini Index of private land considering the legal status of the farmer, measured in
1972.
Ruiz-Maya (1979).
Percentage of landless 
workers in 1797
Percentage of landless workers over the agricultural active population in 1797.
We impute data from historical regions to current provinces by estimating (with
ArcGIS) the percentage of area in each province that corresponds to each
historical region.
Authors’ elaboration using data 
from Morales (1998)  and 1797 
population census (INE, 1992).
Percentage of landless 
workers in 1956
Percentage of landless workers over the agricultural active population in 1956. Junta Nacional de Hermandades 
(1959).
TABLE 9 - DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES (IV)
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Variable Description Source
Variables used as mechanisms (Continued)
Percentage of population 
entities under Church 
jurisdiction in 1787
Variable measuring the percentage of population entities under ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction in 1787.
Authors’ elaboration using the 
1787 population census (INE, 
1987).
Percentage of population 
entities under seigneurial 
jurisdiction in 1787
Variable measuring the percentage of population entities under either noble or
military order jurisdiction in 1787.
Authors’ elaboration using the 
1787 population census (INE, 
1987).
Market fragmentation (Road 
density in 1760)
Kilometers of roads in 1760 (“caminos de ruedas”) over provincial surface area
(in km2).
Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and data from IGN 
(2008).
Outcomes variables in the 1860s
Convicts and Crimes Total crimes committed over total population in 1860 (in thousands). Total
convicts over total population  in 1860 (in thousands).
1860-1861 Statistical Yearbook
of Spain (JGE 1863a); 1860
population census (JGE 1863b).
Infant mortality Infant mortality rates. Probability of dying (per thousand) of individuals under
one year in 1860.
Regional and provincial mortality
tables. Spain 1860 (Proyecto-
Nisal, 2014).
Life expectancy Life expectancy at birth in 1860. Regional and provincial mortality
tables. Spain 1860 (Proyecto-
Nisal, 2014).
Literacy rate Total literacy rates for the adult population in 1860. Núñez (1992).
Percentage of electors and 
voters
Electors (or voters) in the parliamentary election of 1865 as a percentage of the
male population aged 25 or older.
Authors’ elaboration from the
1862-1865 Statistical Yearbook
of Spain (JGE 1865) and the 1860
population census (JGE 1863b).
School enrollment Total children enrolled over the population under 15 years. Authors’ elaboration from the
1860 population census (JGE
1863b).
Variables at municipal level
Altitude Altitude corresponding to the municipality centroid. Geographic Nomenclature of 
Municipalities and Local 
Population (IGN 2012).
Annual average temperature Annual average temperature corresponding to the municipality centroid (in
centigrade degrees multiplied by 10).
Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and data from WorldClim 
(Hijmans et al., 2005).
Annual rainfall Annual precipitation corresponding to the municipality centroid (in millimeters). Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and data from WorldClim 
(Hijmans et al., 2005).
Average number of vehicles 
per household
Number of vehicles (cars and vans) for personal transport owned by households,
divided by the number of households. The year of measurement is 2001.
INE. Censos de Población y 
Viviendas 2001 (www.ine.es).
Average socioeconomic 
condition
Average of class marks of socioeconomic conditions of individuals (multiplied
by 100). Socioeconomic condition is obtained by combining information from
the variables occupation, activity and professional situation. To illustrate the
construction of this variable, a (maximum) class mark of 3 is given to non-
agricultural entrepreneurs with employees, and a (minimun) class mark of 0 to
those unemployed who have not worked previously. The year of measurement is
2001.
INE. Censos de Población y 
Viviendas 2001 (www.ine.es).
TABLE 9 - DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES (V)
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Variable Description Source
Variables at municipal level (Continued)
Distance to Madrid Linear distance between the centroid of the municipality and Madrid (in km),
using ArcGIS.
Authors’ elaboration.
Distance to the coast Linear distance between the centroid of the municipality and the nearest point of
the coast (in km), using ArcGIS.
Authors’ elaboration.
Distance to the nearest 
capital
Linear distance between the centroid of the municipality and the nearest
provincial capital (in km), using ArcGIS.
Authors’ elaboration.
Excess salts This variable assesses the following soil characteristics: “Soil salinity, soil
sodicity and soil phases influencing salt conditions ”. We calculate the average
value of the municipality.
Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and data from Fischer et 
al. (2008).
High rate of Reconquest (> 
provincial average) or (> 
1.25*provincial average)
Dummy variable indicating whether the rate of Reconquest corresponding to the
municipality is higher than the provincial average, or 1.25 times higher than the
provincial average.
Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and information from 
Mestre-Campi and Sabaté (1998).
Labor force activity rate Labor force activity rate of the population between 20 and 59 years old. The year
of measurement is 2001.
INE. Censos de Población y 
Viviendas 2001 (www.ine.es).
Latitude Latitude of the municipality centroid. Geographic Nomenclature of 
Municipalities and Local 
Population (IGN 2012).
Nutrient availability This variable assesses the following soil characteristics: “Soil texture, soil
organic carbon, soil pH, total exchangeable bases ”. We calculate the average
value of the municipality.
Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and data from Fischer et 
al. (2008).
Nutrient retention capacity This variable assesses the following soil characteristics: “Soil organic carbon,
soil texture, base saturation, cation exchange capacity of soil and of clay
fraction ”. We calculate the average value of the municipality.
Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and data from Fischer et 
al. (2008).
Oxygen availability to roots This variable assesses the following soil characteristics: “Soil drainage and soil
phases affecting soil drainage ”. We calculate the average value of the
municipality.
Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and data from Fischer et 
al. (2008).
Population Log of total population in 2001. INE. Censos de Población y 
Viviendas 2001 (www.ine.es).
Provincial capital dummy Dummy variable indicating whether the municipality is a provincial capital city. Authors’ elaboration.
Rate of Reconquest This variable is created in a similar way to the provincial level variable. In this
case, we assign to each municipality the reconquered area corresponding to the
stage of the Reconquest to which the municipality centroid belongs.
Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and information from 
Mestre-Campi and Sabaté (1998).
Rooting conditions This variable assesses the following soil characteristics: “Soil textures, bulk
density, coarse fragments, vertic soil properties and soil phases affecting root
penetration and soil depth and soil volume ”. We calculate the average value of
the municipality.
Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and data from Fischer et 
al. (2008).
Toxicity This variable assesses the following soil characteristics: “Calcium carbonate
and gypsum ”. We calculate the average value of the municipality.
Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and data from Fischer et 
al. (2008).
Workability This variable assesses the following soil characteristics: “Soil texture, effective
soil depth/volume, and soil phases constraining soil management (soil depth,
rock outcrop, stoniness, gravel/concretions and hardpans) ”. We calculate the
average value of the municipality.
Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and data from Fischer et 
al. (2008).
TABLE 9 - DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES (VI)
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Appendix A. The Reconquest and the pattern of settlement in Spain: The effect of 
rate of Reconquest on the average surface area of municipalities. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
5.06*** 5.318*** 6.164*** 7.27*** 0.042 -0.011
(0.939) (1.205) (1.117) (1.372) (0.028) (0.044)
Crown of Aragon 24.636 7.993 -0.023
(19.065) (19.825) (0.616)
Madrid -10.433 -38.705*** -0.831***
(7.269) (9.723) (0.301)
Rainfall 0.032 0.004 0.001
(0.046) (0.03) (0.001)
Soil quality -33.921 -77.746*** 2.51**
(31.953) (28.276) (1.096)
Ruggedness -21.186 -9.096 1.203
(33.959) (26.019) (0.762)
Mediterranean Sea -8.37 -13.959 -0.422
(16.933) (13.534) (0.5)
Cantabrian Sea 13.813 36.214* -1.307
(48.131) (19.688) (0.905)
Border with Portugal -12.836 -42.041*** -0.475
(11.55) (12.027) (0.295)
Ln distance from Paris 52.714 43.531 1.191
(33.107) (35.009) (1.888)
Coal dummy in 1860 -7.455 -4.187 0.308
(9.718) (11.597) (0.323)
R 2
0.61 0.68 0.49 0.66 0.05 0.32
Number of observations 46 46 50 50 48 48
Falsification test:
TABLE A1 . THE EFFECT OF RATE OF RECONQUEST ON THE AVERAGE SIZE OF MUNICIPALITIES
Rate of Reconquest
Notes : The dependent variables are measured as the ratio of provincial surface area (in km2) to the number of population entities,
municipalities or ancient settlements, respectively. Variables descriptions are provided in Table 9. The estimations include a
constant term, which is omitted for space considerations. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
 Average size of ancient (pre-
medieval) settlements
Average size (in surface area) 
of “singular population 
entities” in 1787
Average size (in surface area) 
of municipalities in 2011
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Appendix B. Descriptive statistics. 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Main dependent variable
Log GDP per capita in 2005 50 9.87 0.20 9.51 10.28 45 9.84 0.19 9.51 10.22
Reconquest indicators
Rate of Reconquest 50 7.08 5.94 0.00 22.53 45 7.78 5.85 1.58 22.53
Rate of Reconquest corresponding to 
the provincial centroid 50 7.30 6.90 0.00 22.66 45 8.11 6.81 0.58 22.66
Stages of Reconquest with 
homogeneous time interval 50 5.73 4.86 0.00 14.66 45 6.37 4.71 0.59 14.66
Post-1212 conquest 50 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 45 0.40 0.50 0.00 1.00
Controls
Agricultural land in 1900 (%) 48 0.33 0.15 0.06 0.71 43 0.36 0.14 0.10 0.71
Arable land in 1962 (%) 50 0.40 0.17 0.04 0.80 45 0.43 0.15 0.17 0.80
Average altitude 50 534.90 276.04 111.01 1,044.14 45 565.25 270.40 121.19 1,044.14
Average urban population density at 
conquest in the Christian kingdom 50 0.48 0.46 0.00 1.54 45 0.53 0.46 0.00 1.54
Border with Portugal 50 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 45 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
Centuries under Muslim domination 50 3.64 2.38 0.00 8.00 45 4.04 2.15 0.00 8.00
Coal dummy in 1860 50 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00 45 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00
Coal output in 1860 50 1.90 4.18 0.00 14.84 45 1.78 3.91 0.00 12.29
Coast dummy 50 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 45 0.40 0.50 0.00 1.00
Coast length/ surface area 50 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.29 45 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.29
Crown of Aragon 50 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 45 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00
Distance from London 50 14.06 0.24 13.76 14.89 45 14.09 0.23 13.81 14.89
Distance from Paris 50 13.88 0.28 13.50 14.85 45 13.91 0.28 13.53 14.85
Distance from Mainz 50 14.17 0.23 13.79 14.99 45 14.19 0.23 13.79 14.99
Distance from Madrid 50 12.54 0.78 8.91 14.41 45 12.52 0.82 8.91 14.41
Distance to the coast 50 1.10 0.94 0.00 3.30 45 1.19 0.95 0.00 3.30
Humidity 50 66.84 5.29 57.00 78.00 45 65.87 4.57 57.00 78.00
Temperature 50 14.64 2.82 10.10 21.20 45 14.80 2.91 10.10 21.20
Rainfall 50 575.28 320.77 134.00 1,691.00 45 511.24 254.24 134.00 1,691.00
Island 50 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 45 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00
Latitude 50 40.12 3.14 28.30 43.29 45 39.79 3.13 28.30 43.13
Land suitability for cotton 50 668.20 761.35 0.00 2,379.11 45 742.44 767.56 0.00 2,379.11
Land suitability for sugar 50 2.24 7.46 0.00 34.53 45 2.49 7.83 0.00 34.53
Land suitability for tobacco 50 1,327.79 528.66 171.52 2,681.86 45 1,371.44 528.30 171.52 2,681.86
Madrid 50 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 45 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00
Mediterranean Sea 50 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 45 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00
Atlantic Ocean 50 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 45 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00
Cantabrian Sea 50 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 45 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00
Roman roads density 50 27.04 14.06 0.00 56.45 45 28.91 13.18 0.00 56.45
Ruggedness 50 0.52 0.34 0.06 1.36 45 0.49 0.34 0.06 1.36
Soil quality 50 0.54 0.20 0.00 1.00 45 0.55 0.20 0.00 1.00
Urban population density in 800 50 0.47 1.72 0.00 11.62 45 0.52 1.81 0.00 11.62
Urban population density at conquest 50 0.99 1.97 0.00 7.91 45 1.10 2.04 0.00 7.91
Wooded steppe (% area) 50 0.38 0.46 0.00 1.00 45 0.32 0.44 0.00 1.00
Years since transition to agriculture 50 7,445.23 34.04 7,339.11 7,530.39 45 7,444.77 35.68 7,339.11 7,530.39
TABLE A2 - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (I)
Full sample Excluding the initial resistance area
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Variables of pre-Reconquest development (not described above)
Ancient settlements over surface area 48 1.30 1.14 0.25 5.93 43 1.23 0.95 0.25 4.17
City population in 800 50 6.50 23.84 0.00 160.00 45 7.22 25.05 0.00 160.00
Coinage of imperial Roman coins over 
surface area 50 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.40 45 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.40
Number of bishoprics circa 600 over 
surface area 50 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.39 45 0.12 0.11 0.00 0.39
Roman roads density: Main roads 50 6.28 7.04 0.00 30.22 45 6.98 7.09 0.00 30.22
Roman villas over surface area 48 0.27 0.29 0.00 1.57 43 0.28 0.30 0.00 1.57
Variables used in the balancedness table (not described above)
Urbanization levels (Density of urban 
population): 800
50 0.47 1.72 0.00 11.62 45 0.52 1.81 0.00 11.62
Urbanization levels (Density of urban 
population): 900 50 0.76 3.19 0.00 22.15 45 0.85 3.35 0.00 22.15
Urbanization levels (Density of urban 
population): 1000 50 1.53 4.78 0.00 32.68 45 1.70 5.01 0.00 32.68
Urbanization levels (Density of urban 
population): 1200 50 1.02 1.71 0.00 6.84 45 1.13 1.77 0.00 6.84
Urbanization levels (Density of urban 
population): 1300 50 1.64 2.37 0.00 11.86 45 1.80 2.44 0.00 11.86
Urbanization levels (Density of urban 
population): 1400 50 1.53 1.92 0.00 7.91 45 1.67 1.97 0.00 7.91
Urbanization levels (Density of urban 
population): 1500 50 1.72 1.99 0.00 8.26 45 1.91 2.01 0.00 8.26
Urbanization levels (Density of urban 
population): 1600
50 2.97 3.48 0.00 16.24 45 3.22 3.57 0.00 16.24
Urbanization levels (Density of urban 
population): 1700 48 2.43 3.48 0.00 17.44 43 2.60 3.62 0.00 17.44
Urbanization levels (Density of urban 
population): 1800 50 6.04 6.70 0.00 29.59 45 6.25 7.01 0.00 29.59
Urbanization levels (Density of urban 
population): 1850 50 8.53 9.72 0.47 41.92 45 8.76 10.22 0.47 41.92
Agricultural output per km2 in 1860 50 5,066.42 3,118.14 1,490.59 16,929.11 45 5,042.61 3,178.96 1,490.59 16,929.11
Agricultural output per capita in 1860 50 147.70 58.40 33.97 369.67 45 153.75 57.89 33.97 369.67
Agricultural productivity in 1860 50 653.31 252.33 122.50 1,582.16 45 671.80 255.63 122.50 1,582.16
Agricultural share over GDP (%) in 
1860 50 42.81 12.90 8.16 72.28 45 44.02 12.57 8.16 72.28
Productive land (%) in 1900 48 0.94 0.05 0.75 1.00 43 0.95 0.04 0.87 1.00
Wheat output per hectare in 1916 50 23.22 4.09 17.20 35.20 45 23.31 4.17 17.20 35.20
Agricultural output per ha in 1950 50 1,155.65 497.91 404.14 2,663.76 45 1,153.19 518.19 404.14 2,663.76
Variables Used in Section VI on the Timing of the Effects (not described above)
Relative GDP per capita in 1860 50 1.00 0.32 0.22 1.91 45 1.00 0.33 0.22 1.88
Relative GDP per capita in 1930 50 1.00 0.39 0.55 2.32 45 1.00 0.37 0.57 2.44
Relative GDP per capita in 1971 50 1.00 0.28 0.61 1.57 45 1.00 0.26 0.64 1.62
Relative GDP per capita in 2005 50 1.00 0.20 0.68 1.49 45 1.00 0.19 0.70 1.43
Relative industrial output per capita in 
1860 50 1.00 0.58 0.23 3.44 45 1.00 0.59 0.22 3.35
Relative industrial output per capita in 
1930 50 1.00 0.79 0.24 3.73 45 1.00 0.72 0.28 4.34
Relative industrial output per capita in 
1970 50 1.00 0.63 0.28 3.08 45 1.00 0.50 0.33 2.79
Relative industrial output per capita in 
2005
50 1.00 0.56 0.24 2.83 45 1.00 0.51 0.26 2.25
Full sample Excluding the initial resistance area
TABLE A2 - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (II)
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Variables used as mechanisms
Family types 50 0.99 0.07 0.87 1.19 45 0.99 0.07 0.87 1.19
Moorish ancestry 48 8.76 8.01 0.00 21.70 43 9.53 7.98 0.00 21.70
Religiosity (Clerical population in 
1797) 50 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03 45 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03
Land concentration in 1962 50 12.63 12.56 0.00 46.30 45 14.01 12.50 0.00 46.30
Land Gini Index in 1972 50 71.22 10.08 50.39 87.51 45 72.73 9.37 50.39 87.51
Percentage of landless workers in 
1797 50 47.99 21.27 3.74 85.77 45 51.50 19.15 17.42 85.77
Percentage of landless workers in 
1956 50 31.08 20.29 2.76 73.05 45 33.60 19.74 6.54 73.05
Percentage of population entities under 
Church jurisdiction in 1787 50 7.99 11.27 0.00 45.90 45 8.65 11.66 0.00 45.90
Percentage of population entities under 
seigneurial jurisdiction in 1787 50 48.31 23.79 0.00 90.00 45 48.86 23.48 0.00 90.00
Market fragmentation (Road density in 
1760) 50 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.06 45 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.06
Outcomes variables in the 1860s
Convicts 50 1.50 0.70 0.43 3.35 45 1.58 0.68 0.44 3.35
Crimes 50 2.28 0.95 0.63 5.20 45 2.40 0.91 0.82 5.20
Infant mortality 50 249.41 52.47 131.58 344.72 45 259.27 44.90 131.79 344.72
Life expectancy 50 29.82 5.09 19.68 45.88 45 29.31 4.94 19.68 45.88
Literacy rate 50 27.40 10.71 14.00 53.00 45 26.18 9.98 14.00 51.00
Percentage of voters 50 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.13 45 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.11
Percentage of electors 50 0.11 0.03 0.06 0.21 45 0.11 0.03 0.06 0.21
School enrollment 50 0.23 0.08 0.08 0.42 45 0.22 0.08 0.08 0.39
Variables at municipal level
Altitude 8,107 613.90 343.79 0.00 1,695.00 7,652 636.65 336.08 0.00 1,695.00
Annual average temperature 8,191 127.48 24.78 24.00 196.00 7,729 127.80 25.24 24.00 196.00
Annual rainfall 8,191 604.80 225.78 113.00 1,522.00 7,729 576.62 196.59 113.00 1,522.00
Average number of vehicles per 
household 8,098 0.96 0.28 0.00 2.51 7,644 0.95 0.28 0.00 2.51
Average socioeconomic condition 8,098 95.12 14.99 31.00 186.00 7,644 94.60 15.09 31.00 186.00
Distance to Madrid 8,191 290.75 202.05 0.00 1,950.28 7,729 288.56 207.68 0.00 1,950.28
Distance to the coast 8,191 131.99 98.88 0.03 370.87 7,729 138.69 97.76 0.03 370.87
Distance to the nearest capital 8,191 44.13 24.41 0.00 230.53 7,729 45.02 24.50 0.00 230.53
Excess salts 8,047 0.03 0.11 0.00 1.00 7,674 0.03 0.11 0.00 1.00
High rate of Reconquest (> provincial 
average) 8,191 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 7,729 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
High rate of Reconquest (> 
1.25*provincial average)
8,191 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 7,729 0.21 0.40 0.00 1.00
Labor force activity rate 8,098 74.36 7.09 27.27 100.00 7,644 74.34 7.17 27.27 100.00
Latitude 8,107 40.73 2.11 27.70 43.74 7,652 40.59 2.08 27.70 43.74
Nutrient availability 8,047 0.08 0.16 0.00 1.00 7,674 0.08 0.16 0.00 1.00
Nutrient retention capacity 8,047 0.05 0.13 0.00 1.00 7,674 0.05 0.13 0.00 1.00
Oxygen availability to roots 8,047 0.01 0.06 0.00 1.00 7,674 0.01 0.06 0.00 1.00
Population 8,098 6.54 1.75 1.95 14.89 7,644 6.49 1.75 1.95 14.89
Provincial capital dummy 8,191 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00 7,729 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00
Rate of Reconquest 8,191 5.90 5.32 0.00 22.66 7,729 6.25 5.27 0.29 22.66
Rooting conditions 8,047 0.37 0.27 0.00 1.00 7,674 0.36 0.27 0.00 1.00
Soil quality 8,047 0.83 0.11 0.00 1.00 7,674 0.83 0.11 0.00 1.00
Toxicity 8,047 0.04 0.11 0.00 1.00 7,674 0.04 0.11 0.00 1.00
Workability 8,047 0.35 0.21 0.00 1.00 7,674 0.34 0.21 0.00 1.00
Notes:  Variables descriptions are provided in Table 9.
TABLE A2 - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (III)
Full sample Excluding the initial resistance area
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Appendix C. The effect of rate of Reconquest: Alternative functional forms. 
 
(1) (2) (3)
-0.04***
(0.014)
0.001**
(0.00)
Log of rate of Reconquest -0.142***
(0.037)
-0.055
(0.048)
-0.084
(0.063)
-0.235***
(0.049)
Crown of Aragon -0.019 -0.031 -0.022
(0.089) (0.093) (0.075)
Madrid 0.417*** 0.418*** 0.386***
(0.026) (0.023) (0.047)
Rainfall 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Soil quality 0.364** 0.375*** 0.323**
(0.138) (0.136) (0.135)
Ruggedness 0.211** 0.214** 0.239**
(0.1) (0.102) (0.09)
Mediterranean Sea -0.01 -0.008 -0.014
(0.049) (0.05) (0.058)
Cantabrian Sea -0.018 -0.01 -0.038
(0.043) (0.042) (0.056)
Border with Portugal -0.038 -0.03 -0.045
(0.045) (0.046) (0.044)
Ln distance from Paris -0.297** -0.315** -0.361***
(0.122) (0.117) (0.112)
Coal dummy in 1860 0.045 0.04 0.043
(0.038) (0.043) (0.043)
R 2 0.78 0.77 0.78
Number of observations 45 45 45
Rate of Reconquest squared
Notes : Variables descriptions are provided in Table 9. The estimations include a constant term, which is omitted for
space considerations. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1%
level, respectively. 
Rate of Reconquest
Second quartile of rate of Reconquest
Third quartile of rate of Reconquest
Fourth quartile of rate of Reconquest
TABLE A3 - THE EFFECT OF RATE OF RECONQUEST: ALTERNATIVE FUNCTIONAL FORMS
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2005
Quadratic polynomial in rate 
of Reconquest Log of rate of Reconquest
Quartile division of rate of 
Reconquest
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Appendix D. Replication of tables 1 and 2 using the full sample of 50 Spanish 
provinces. 
 
 
Rate of 
Reconquest
Additional 
control R
2 N Rate of 
Reconquest
Additional 
control R
2 N
-0.018*** 0.3 50
(0.004)
-0.017*** 0.3 45 (20) -0.019*** -0.0001* 0.3 50
(0.004) (0.004) (0.00)
(21) -0.019*** 0.097 0.3 50
-0.019*** -0.046 0.3 50 (0.003) (0.062)
(0.004) (0.055)
-0.018*** 0.000 0.3 50 (22) -0.019*** 0.079 0.3 50
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.055)
-0.019*** 0.000 0.3 50 (23) -0.018*** -0.026 0.3 50
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.059)
-0.017*** -0.015** 0.3 50 (24) -0.019*** -0.02 0.3 50
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.087)
-0.017*** -0.007 0.3 50 (25) -0.019*** 0.08 0.3 50
(0.004) (0.015) (0.004) (0.066)
-0.019*** 0.014 0.3 50 (26) -0.018*** 0.038 0.3 50
(0.004) (0.053) (0.004) (0.048)
-0.016*** -0.01 0.3 50 (27) -0.018*** 0.329 0.3 50
(0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.307)
-0.016*** 0.139*** 0.4 50 (28) -0.018*** -0.047* 0.4 50
(0.004) (0.044) (0.003) (0.028)
-0.018*** 0.356*** 0.4 50 (29) -0.016*** -0.164*** 0.4 50
(0.004) (0.023) (0.004) (0.054)
(30) -0.018*** -0.014 0.3 50
-0.017*** 0.006 0.3 50 (0.004) (0.041)
(0.004) (0.006) (31) -0.014*** -0.199 0.3 50
(13) -0.02*** 0.005 0.3 50 (0.004) (0.121)
(0.004) (0.007) (32) -0.011** -0.262* 0.4 50
(14) -0.019*** 0.00 0.3 50 (0.005) (0.135)
(0.004) (0.00) (33) -0.012** -0.339** 0.4 50
(15) -0.015*** 0.006 0.3 50 (0.005) (0.168)
(0.005) (0.007)
(16) -0.022*** 0.397*** 0.5 50 (34) -0.02*** 0.156 0.3 48
(0.004) (0.08) (0.005) (0.193)
(17) -0.019*** 0.001 0.3 50 (35) -0.018*** -0.069 0.3 50
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.147)
(18) -0.02*** 0.00 0.3 50 (36) -0.018*** 0.061 0.3 50
(0.006) (0.00) (0.004) (0.053)
(19) -0.018*** 0.000 0.3 50 (37) -0.018*** 0.003 0.3 50
(0.004) (0.00) (0.004) (0.005)
TABLE A4 - THE EFFECT OF THE RECONQUEST ON CURRENT DEVELOPMENT
A: Basic relationship
Climatic, geographic and topographic factors (Continued)(1) 50 provinces
(2) Initial resistance 
provinces removed
Average altitude 
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2005
B:  Neolithic and Historical controls Ruggedness
(3) Wooded steppe (% 
area) D: Geographic controls related to transportation costs
(4) Years since 
transition to 
Mediterranean Sea
(5) Roman roads density Atlantic Ocean
(6) Urban population 
density in 800
Cantabrian Sea
(7) Urban population 
density at conquest
Island
(8) Av. urban pop.dens. at 
conquest in the 
Christian kingdom
Coast Dummy
(9) Centuries under 
Muslim domination
Coast length/ 
surface area
(10) Crown of Aragon Distance to the 
coast
(11) Madrid Border with 
Portugal
C: Climatic, geographic and topographic factors Ln distance from 
Madrid(12) Latitude
Ln distance from 
LondonTemperature
Ln distance from 
ParisRainfall
Ln distance from 
MainzHumidity
E: Natural resources endowments
Soil quality Agric. land 1900 
(%)
Notes : Variables descriptions are provided in Table 9. The estimations include a constant term, which is omitted for space
considerations. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
Land suitability for 
sugar
Arable land 1962 
(%)
Land suitability for 
cotton
Coal dummy in 
1860
Land suitability for 
tobacco
Coal output in 
1860
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Appendix E. Replication of Table 2 using two alternative small-sample correction 
methods. 
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Appendix F. Replication of Table 2 correcting standard errors (SEs) for spatial 
dependence. 
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Appendix G. Tackling the North-South gradient issue. 
 
Dependent variable → Log GDP per capita in 2005 Rate of Reconquest Latitude Latitude
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.008* 0.023
(0.004) (0.017)
0.023
(0.171)
Crown of Aragon -0.176* -7.649** -0.709*
(0.086) (3.413) (0.348)
Madrid 0.428*** -0.397 0.083
(0.029) (1.099) (0.169)
Rainfall 0** -0.01* 0.001*
(0) (0.005) (0.001)
Soil quality 0.41*** 5.963 -3.024***
(0.113) (4.568) (0.995)
Ruggedness 0.116 9.755* -0.484
(0.081) (4.881) (0.54)
Mediterranean Sea 0.061 -0.472 -0.045
(0.064) (2.029) (0.258)
Cantabrian Sea 0.047 1.807 0.26
(0.061) (2.516) (0.451)
Border with Portugal -0.26*** 4.329 0.542*
(0.082) (3.154) (0.288)
10.117 -1.163 -10.11***
(7.35) (6.513) (0.589)
Coal dummy in 1860 0.015 0.639 -0.122
(0.042) (2.3) (0.224)
Cubic polynomial in latitude and longitude Yes
R 2 0.93 0.45 0.001 0.98
Number of observations 45 45 45 45
Rate of Reconquest
Ln distance from Paris
Notes : Variables descriptions are provided in Table 9. The estimations include a constant term, which is omitted for space
considerations. The cubic polynomial takes the form x + y + x2 + y2 + xy + x3 + y3 + x2y + xy2+ x2y2, where x denotes latitude and y
denotes longitude. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
Residuals of rate of Reconquest from 
regression in column (2)
TABLE A9 - THE EFFECT OF THE RECONQUEST ON CURRENT DEVELOPMENT: THE NORTH-SOUTH GRADIENT ISSUE.
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Appendix H. Exploiting variation across the stages of the Reconquest: Aggregating 
provincial-level data at the stage of Reconquest level. 
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Figure A1. Relationship between current GDP per capita and rate of  Reconquest: Aggregating
provincial-level data at the stage of Reconquest level.
Notes: 
The y-axis variable is the logarithm of the weighted average of output per capita in 2005 for the territory corresponding to each 
Reconquest stage, using provincial surface area in each stage as weights. 
Note that the 1266-1450 Reconquest stage in Castile is a clear outlier caused by the stability of the frontier of Granada over an 
extended period of time.
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.015*** -0.01** -0.015*** -0.01**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
0.031** 0.032*
(0.014) (0.015)
Constant 9.959*** 8.672*** 9.955*** 8.63***
(0.041) (0.569) (0.046) (0.618)
R 2 0.40 0.56 0.38 0.54
Number of observations 17 17 16 16
TABLE A10 - THE EFFECT OF THE RECONQUEST ON CURRENT DEVELOPMENT: AGGREGATING PROVINCIAL-LEVEL 
DATA AT THE STAGE OF RECONQUEST LEVEL.
Rate of Reconquest
Latitude corresponding to the centroid of 
the stage of the Reconquest
Notes : The dependent variable is the logarithm of the weighted average of output per capita in 2005 for the territory corresponding to
each Reconquest stage, using provincial surface area in each stage as weights. Variables descriptions are provided in Table 9. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2005
The whole territory of Spain Initial resistance area removed
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Figure A2. Relationship between current GDP per capita and rate of  Reconquest: Aggregating provincial-
level data at the stage of Reconquest level: Robustness checks
Notes: 
The y-axis variable is the logarithm of the weighted average of output per capita in 2005 for the territory corresponding to each 
Reconquest stage, using provincial surface area in each stage as weights. 
Note that the 1266-1450 Reconquest stage in Castile is a clear outlier caused by the stability of the frontier of Granada over an extended 
period of time.
Panel A: Comparing the slope of the regression line when removing areas conquered between 
1220 and 1266 in Castile.
Panel B: Removing areas conquered after 1220 in Castile and Aragon
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Appendix I. Exploiting variation across the stages of the Reconquest: Aggregating 
municipality-level data at the stage of Reconquest level. 
 
 
Figure A3. Relationship between average socioeconomic condition and rate of  Reconquest: Aggregating 
municipality-level data at the stage of Reconquest level.
Notes: 
The y-axis variable reflects the average value of the indicator for the municipalities located within each stage of the 
Reconquest. 
Note that the 1266-1450 Reconquest stage in Castile is a clear outlier caused by the stability of the frontier of Granada over an 
extended period of time.
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Figure A4. Relationship between average number of vehicles per household and rate of  Reconquest: 
Aggregating municipality-level data at the stage of Reconquest level.
Notes: 
The y-axis variable reflects the average value of the indicator for the municipalities located within each stage of the 
Reconquest. 
Note that the 1266-1450 Reconquest stage in Castile is a clear outlier caused by the stability of the frontier of Granada over an 
extended period of time.
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Figure A5. Relationship between labor force activity rate and rate of  Reconquest: Aggregating 
municipality-level data at the stage of Reconquest level.
Notes: 
The y-axis variable reflects the average value of the indicator for the municipalities located within each stage of the 
Reconquest.
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Average 
socioeconomic 
condition
Average number of 
vehicles per 
household
Labor force activity 
rate
(1) (2) (3)
Latitude
1.463 -0.005 0.585
(1.988) (0.022) (0.661)
Constant 21.914 0.987 54.547**
(73.5) (0.821) (24.443)
Reconquest stages dummies Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.40 0.30 0.10
Number of obs 7,644 7,644 7,644
TABLE A12 - NORTH-SOUTH GRADIENT: WITHIN 'STAGE OF RECONQUEST' VARIATION IN 
LATITUDE
Notes: Variables descriptions are provided in Table 9. Standard errors clustered at the stage of 
Reconquest level are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, 
respectively.  
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Appendix J. Municipality-level analysis correcting SEs for spatial dependence and 
clustering SEs at the province level. 
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Appendix K. Correlations between indicators of pre-Reconquest development and 
suitability for agriculture. 
 
 
Agricultural land 1900 
(%) Arable land 1962 (%)
City population in 800 0.2642* 0.2749*
0.0696 0.0533
Density of urban population in 800 0.2817* 0.2707*
0.0524 0.0573
Years since transition to agriculture -0.0129 -0.1147
0.9308 0.4275
Ancient settlements over surface area 0.1488 0.0628
0.3127 0.6646
Roman roads density: Main roads 0.2941** 0.3915***
0.0425 0.0049
Roman roads density 0.2356+ 0.3676***
0.107 0.0086
Coinage of imperial Roman coins over surface area 0.2478* 0.2091
0.0895 0.145
Roman villas over surface area 0.3869*** 0.3010**
0.0066 0.0337
Number of bishoprics circa 600 over surface area 0.1589 0.1763
0.2808 0.2206
TABLE A15. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INDICATORS OF PRE-RECONQUEST DEVELOPMENT AND 
SUITABILITY FOR AGRICULTURE
Notes:  Variables descriptions are provided in Table 9. For each entry we provide the correlation coefficient (above) 
and the p-value (below). +, *, ** and *** denote significance at the 11, 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.  
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Appendix L. 2SLS regressions using soil quality as an instrument. 
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Our theory (Specification 
used in Table 6, column 1)
Reconquest rate → Landless 
workers 1797 → Current 
income
Soil quality →              
Landless workers 1797 → 
Current income
Soil quality →              
Landless workers 1797 → 
Current income
Soil quality enters as an 
exogenous regressor
Reconquest rate enters as an 
exogenous regressor
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Second stage
-0.009*** 0.01 0.019
(0.003) (0.008) (0.014)
Soil quality 0.601***
(0.194)
Rate of reconquest -0.048*
(0.027)
Crown of Aragon 0.042 0.141 -0.176
(0.094) (0.128) (0.238)
Madrid 0.525*** 0.269* 0.129
(0.04) (0.14) (0.222)
Rainfall 0,000 0,000 0,000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ruggedness 0.226* 0.003 0.361
(0.125) (0.22) (0.305)
Mediterranean Sea 0.026 -0.074 -0.144
(0.072) (0.106) (0.145)
Cantabrian Sea -0.071 0.073 0.227
(0.067) (0.15) (0.236)
Border with Portugal -0.082 -0.077 0.131
(0.066) (0.093) (0.181)
-0.185 -0.565 -0.8
(0.12) (0.398) (0.48)
Coal dummy in 1860 0.092* -0.008 -0.025
(0.053) (0.135) (0.141)
Panel B: First stage
1.683*** 1.683***
(0.402) (0.402)
Soil quality 21.273 31.312* 21.273
(13.876) (16.049) (13.876)
Crown of Aragon 7.706 -5.171 7.706
(8.036) (8.319) (8.036)
Madrid 14.001*** 13.333*** 14.001***
(2.925) (3.526) (2.925)
Rainfall 0,000 -0.017 0,000
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Ruggedness -4.78 11.641 -4.78
(12.855) (13.572) (12.855)
Mediterranean Sea 6.003 5.209 6.003
(6.345) (6.668) (6.345)
Cantabrian Sea -10.557* -7.515 -10.557*
(5.749) (7.888) (5.749)
Border with Portugal -7.561 -0.274 -7.561
(5.158) (6.356) (5.158)
21.746* 19.788 21.746*
(12.314) (17.551) (12.314)
Coal dummy in 1860 4.121 5.196 4.121
(5.174) (6.847) (5.174)
R 2 0,7 0,56 0,7
Number of observations 45 45 45
Falsification test: soil quality as an instrument
TABLE A16 - 2SLS REGRESSIONS USING SOIL QUALITY AS AN INSTRUMENT
Rate of Reconquest
Ln distance from Paris
Notes : Variables descriptions are provided in Table 9. The estimations include a constant term, which is omitted for space considerations. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses.  Small-sample correction for standard errors is applied. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2005
Ln distance from Paris
Percentage of landless workers in 1797
2SLS framework →
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Appendix M. The timing of the effect of the Reconquest: Regression results. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Rate of Reconquest x 1930 -1.932** -1.587** -1.761** -1.953*** -1.907** -1.171 -1.134
(0.743) (0.757) (0.743) (0.713) (0.741) (0.836) (0.916)
Rate of Reconquest x 1971 -2.655*** -2.33*** -2.526*** -2.676*** -2.665*** -2.192** -2.23**
(0.695) (0.691) (0.691) (0.657) (0.714) (0.872) (0.924)
Rate of Reconquest x 2005 -2.806*** -2.377*** -2.631*** -2.823*** -2.84*** -2.252** -2.209**
(0.737) (0.738) (0.733) (0.711) (0.76) (0.868) (0.937)
Soil quality x 1930 -33.795* -15.895
(20.119) (20.55)
Soil quality x 1971 -31.815 -18.796
(21.243) (22.434)
Soil quality x 2005 -42.017** -20.536
(19.765) (20.116)
Cantabrian Sea x 1930 54.476*** 54.663***
(6.059) (9.517)
Cantabrian Sea x 1971 41.1*** 35.776***
(5.01) (11.01)
Cantabrian Sea x 2005 55.437*** 45.849***
(5.393) (9.566)
Coal dummy x 1930 19.876 17.822
(12.684) (11.847)
Coal dummy x 1971 19.409** 19.23**
(8.777) (8.768)
Coal dummy x 2005 16.367 15.482
(10.75) (9.852)
Medit. Sea x 1930 11.559 13.705
(14.1) (14.12)
Medit. Sea x 1971 -4.393 -2.405
(13.084) (13.308)
Medit. Sea x 2005 -15.805 -13.501
(13.016) (13.176)
Log distance to Paris x 1930 -31.478 -18.778
(23.308) (24.494)
Log distance to Paris x 1971 -19.162 -6.052
(25.214) (26.122)
Log distance to Paris x 2005 -22.902 -11.935
(23.844) (24.534)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R 2 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.7 0.69 0.73
Number of observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 180
Notes : Panel specifications that regress each province’s GDP per capita relative to the national average over the
1860-2005 period on the interaction between rate of Reconquest and time dummies, with data measured at 1860,
1930, 1970 and 2005. Variables descriptions are provided in Table 9. The estimations include a constant term, which
is omitted for space considerations. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Small-sample correction for standard
errors is applied. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
TABLE A17 - THE TIMING OF THE EFFECT OF THE RECONQUEST: REGRESSION RESULTS (II)
Dependent variable is relative GDP per capita
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Rate of Reconquest x 1930 -4.573*** -4.741*** -4.58*** -4.604*** -4.576*** -4.07*** -4.476***
(1.125) (1.235) (1.158) (1.16) (1.151) (1.296) (1.495)
Rate of Reconquest x 1971 -5.856*** -5.774*** -5.809*** -5.855*** -5.928*** -4.84*** -4.802***
(1.057) (1.145) (1.085) (1.084) (1.148) (1.244) (1.433)
Rate of Reconquest x 2005 -6.397*** -6.098*** -6.281*** -6.396*** -6.537*** -4.766*** -4.655***
(1.269) (1.4) (1.307) (1.291) (1.325) (1.354) (1.587)
Soil quality x 1930 16.414 27.5
(25.964) (33.383)
Soil quality x 1971 -8.046 29.844
(22.931) (32.922)
Soil quality x 2005 -29.307 34.772
(27.254) (35.054)
Cantabrian Sea x 1930 -2,00 14.354
(10.841) (14.509)
Cantabrian Sea x 1971 15.057* 17.835
(8.984) (15.207)
Cantabrian Sea x 2005 36.884*** 33.09**
(12.77) (15.982)
Coal dummy x 1930 29.069 26.849
(22.081) (19.716)
Coal dummy x 1971 -1.186 -10.426
(18.545) (17.647)
Coal dummy x 2005 -1.191 -15.326
(28.459) (24.361)
Medit. Sea x 1930 -1.382 -3.048
(22.864) (22.42)
Medit. Sea x 1971 -33.491* -35.811**
(18.1) (17.703)
Medit. Sea x 2005 -64.902*** -67.65***
(24.191) (23.486)
Log distance to Paris x 1930 -20.833 -15.23
(40.194) (36.888)
Log distance to Paris x 1971 -42.021 -56.616*
(37.215) (34.029)
Log distance to Paris x 2005 -67.485 -87.796**
(41.178) (36.628)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R 2 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,74 0,71 0,77
Number of observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 180
TABLE A18 - THE TIMING OF THE EFFECT OF THE RECONQUEST: REGRESSION RESULTS (III)
Dependent variable is relative industrial output  per capita
Notes : Panel specifications that regress each province’s industrial output per capita relative to the national average over
the 1860-2005 period on the interaction between rate of Reconquest and time dummies, with data measured at 1860,
1930, 1970 and 2005. Variables descriptions are provided in Table 9. The estimations include a constant term, which is
omitted for space considerations. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Small-sample correction for standard errors
is applied. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
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Appendix N. Correlations between GDP per capita 2005 and several proxies for 
economic development over time. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-0.002
(0.001)
-0.002
(0.001)
0.000
(0.002)
0.000
(0.002)
0.000
(0.002)
0.001
(0.002)
0.002
(0.001)
0.002
(0.002)
9.87*** 9.895*** 9.849*** 9.846*** 9.845*** 9.806*** 9.727*** 9.74***
(0.037) (0.044) (0.04) (0.044) (0.047) (0.057) (0.08) (0.094)
R 2 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.02
Number of observations 42 41 45 45 45 45 45 45
Urbanization rate 1981
Urbanization rate 2001
Urbanization rate circa 1600
Urbanization rate 1787
Constant
TABLE A20 - CORRELATIONS BETWEEN GDP PER CAPITA 2005 AND URBANIZATION RATE FROM 
1600 TO 2001
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2005
Notes : Variables descriptions are provided in Table 9. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
Urbanization rate 1860
Urbanization rate 1900
Urbanization rate 1930
Urbanization rate 1960
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log GDP per capita 1860 0.102
(0.063)
Log GDP per capita 1930 0.401***
(0.056)
Log GDP per capita 1971 0.63***
(0.047)
Log industrial output per capita 1860 0.042
(0.048)
Log industrial output per capita 1930 0.188***
(0.03)
Log industrial output per capita 1970 0.271***
(0.037)
Log industrial output per capita 2005 0.221***
(0.041)
Constant 9.247*** 7.021*** 1.542** 9.671*** 8.839*** 7.229*** 8.102***
(0.359) (0.393) (0.62) (0.188) (0.158) (0.362) (0..328)
R-squared 0.04 0.43 0.74 0.02 0.4 0.53 0.40
Number of obs 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2005
TABLE A21 - CORRELATIONS BETWEEN GDP PER CAPITA 2005 AND GDP PER CAPITA AND 
INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT PER CAPITA AT SEVERAL POINTS IN TIME
Notes : Variables descriptions are provided in Table 9. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
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Figure A6. Values of the coefficients of correlation between log GDP 
per capita in 2005 and several proxies for economic development 
measured from 800 to 2005
-.5
0
.5
1
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
 o
f c
or
re
la
tio
n
800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
Year
Density of urban population Urbanization rate
Ln GDP per capita Ln industrial output per capita
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
1860 1930 1971 2005
1860 0.6426
1930 0.5431
1960 0.3453
2001 0.1534
1860 0.7367
1930 0.8062
1970 0.8297
2005 0.6354
Urbanization rate
Ln Industrial output per capita
TABLE A22 - COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION AT SEVERAL POINTS IN TIME BETWEEN LN GDP PER 
CAPITA AND I) URBANIZATION RATE OR II) LN INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT PER CAPITA
Ln GDP per capita
Notes : Number of observations: 45. Variables descriptions are provided in Table 9.  
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Appendix O. Taking into account that the exact timing of industrialization may be 
endogenous. 
 
The above results in Appendix N suggest that the Reconquest is clearly linked to 
industrialization. We pursue this question further by taking into account that the exact 
timing of industrialization in Spain may be endogenous. Thus, we complement the 
previous analysis with some panel regressions formerly used by AJR (2002, p. 1274-5), 
which use industrialization in the UK as a proxy for the opportunity to industrialize. For 
the sake of robustness, we also consider industrialization in the US as an alternative to 
the British, using in both cases data from Mitchell (2007a, b). The panel data 
specification is as follows: 
yit= αi + θt + δ  Reconquesti x Industrializationt + νit              (A.1) 
where yit is either provincial GDP per capita or industrial output per capita expressed 
in relative terms with respect to the national average at date t (1860, 1930, 1971, and 
2005). αi is a set of province-level dummies and θt stands for a set of time dummies. 
Reconquesti represents the rate of Reconquest in province i and Industrializationt 
denotes either UK industrial output or US industrial output at date t, as alternative 
measures of the opportunity to industrialize. The coefficient of interest is δ on the 
interaction between rate of Reconquest and industrialization, which should be negative 
and statistically significant. This would imply that the negative effect of the rate of 
Reconquest becomes more pervasive when the opportunity to industrialize arrived. 
Table A25 presents the panel regressions for the cases in which the dependent variable 
is relative GDP per capita and relative industrial output per capita. It is worth stressing 
that the interaction term δ appears negative and statistically significant at the 1% level 
in all cases, which is consistent with the results reported in Appendix N. In sum, all 
these results suggest that the adverse effect of the Reconquest on income occurred 
mainly during industrialization, and has persisted since then. The remainder of the paper 
sets out to explain these findings. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.01*** -0.023***
(0.003) (0.005)
-0.002*** -0.004***
(0) (0.001)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R 2 0.67 0.66 0.68 0.67
Number of observations 180 180 180 180
TABLE A23 - THE TIMING OF THE EFFECT OF THE RECONQUEST: PANEL RESULTS
Notes : Variables descriptions are provided in Table 9. The dependent variables GDP and industrial output per capita
are expressed in relative terms with respect to the national average in each period. The panel consists of four data
points: 1860, 1930, 1971 and 2005. The estimations include a constant term, which is omitted for space considerations.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
Rate of Reconquest * UK industrial 
output
Rate of Reconquest * US industrial 
output
Dependent variable is relative GDP 
per capita (average=100)
Dependent variable is relative 
industrial output per capita 
(average=100)
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Appendix P. Implications of land inequality. 
 
In a society like preindustrial Spain where agriculture was by far the most important 
economic activity, having access to a key factor of production such as land was decisive 
for social inequality and economic development. Not surprisingly, the highly unequal 
land distribution in the South was considered a first-order problem, which led 
throughout modern Spanish history to intense debates about the “agrarian question”. 
The enlightenment reformers of the eighteenth century pointed to unequal 
landownership as a main factor behind Spanish agrarian and economic backwardness. 
Regarding the implications for social inequality, Pablo de Olavide (1768), Intendent of 
Seville in the second half of the eighteenth century, described the social structure of 
Andalusia (in southern Spain) as divided into four classes. First, the smaller class of 
owners, who rarely cultivate their lands but they rather lease them. Second, the class of 
large tenants, many of whom sublet land divided into smaller plots. Third, the class of 
small tenants, who, in addition to paying high rents, cannot properly cultivate the land 
because leases were granted for such short periods that each year they were in danger of 
losing their holdings. Finally, the fourth class, the crowd, is composed mostly of 
landless workers. In Olavide’s words, they are:  
“the unhappiest men that I know in Europe. They exercise to go to work to farmhouses or olive 
yards, but they can only go when they are called by the administrator of the farmhouse, that is, 
in the proper times for work. Then, despite being almost clothless and always sleeping on the 
floor, at least they can live on the bread and gazpacho they are given. But when the dead time 
arrives, that in which one cannot work outdoor due to for instance lack of rain or when the fields 
are left fallow for the rest of the year, these men die of starvation, they have neither shelter nor 
hope, and they are obliged to go begging […] These men are half-a-year laborers, and the other 
half beggars” (authors’ translation). 
This class of landless laborers, which can be traced back to the fifteenth century,1 was 
the consequence of the concentration of land in the hands of the nobility and military 
                                                            
1 According to Cabrera (1989) “From the 1460s onwards the existence of a large rural proletariat [in the 
Guadalquivir Valley] can be clearly documented. Indeed, use of the notarial records alone would suggest 
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orders. They were mainly located in the Spanish regions conquered relatively fast. The 
1797 population census reflects that landless workers represented about three quarters 
of the agricultural labor force in those regions conquered by Castile since the thirteenth 
century (i.e., the territories where the privileged orders received a large number of land 
grants), while the situation was completely different in regions conquered earlier 
(Malefakis 1970). This situation was condemning the mass of the agricultural 
population to a very low standard of living and a chronic situation of seasonal 
unemployment (Pascual and Sudriá 2002). In addition, they suffered the abuses of 
landowners who controlled town councils and promoted regulations in favor of their 
interests such as price caps on daily wages and severe punishment for property crimes 
(Dominguez-Ortiz 1955). This picture, far from disappearing, lasted until well into the 
twentieth century.2 High social inequality generated by the unequal land distribution led 
to severe social tensions and conflicts, always characterized by a deep hunger for land. 
Thus, the “agrarian question” can be considered as a major historical problem in Spain 
and its lack of solution as the most important single cause of the Civil War in 1936-
1939 (Brenan 1943).  
Regarding the implications for economic development, high land concentration had 
negative consequences for agriculture productivity as highlighted by enlightenment 
thinkers of the eighteenth century (e.g., Olavide 1768; Jovellanos 1795).3 However, the 
fundamental implications for regional income distribution emerged when Spain entered 
into the industrial revolution in the second half of the nineteenth century. Until this 
period, the higher land fertility of many of the large estates regions was sufficient to 
make them stand among the richest in Spain. For example, still in 1860, at the 
beginning of the industrialization period, Andalusia was the second wealthiest region, 
                                                                                                                                                                              
that those who actually worked the land were never, or hardly ever, the owners of it, the owners in effect 
being rentiers” (p. 480). 
2 Referring to the first half of the twentieth century, Brenan (1943) observes that “lower Andalusia is 
probably the only region in Europe where the condition of the agricultural workers has not improved in 
the last a hundred and fifty years” (p. 122). 
3 It was due, for instance, to absentee landlords that were little concerned with improving farming 
techniques, concentration of rural population in a few towns, lack of incentives of small tenants and 
landless workers who cultivate the land, inefficiency in cultivating large estates, insufficient reinvestment 
of rents and profits as well as insecurity and poor conditions of the labor force (Carrión 1975; Malefakis 
1970). 
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ahead of Catalonia and the Basque Country, with a level of per capita GDP about 36 
percentage points above the Spanish average. But seventy years later, in 1930, 
Andalusia was among the poorest regions, with a level of per capita GDP of only 77 
percent of the Spanish average (data from Rosés et al. 2010). As argued in the main 
text, this occurred because of the failure to industrialize in the southern region of Spain, 
which was largely caused by the concentration of land in a few hands. Structural 
inequality prevented a broad-based participation of the population in economic activity, 
blocking industrialization and hindering the prospects for economic development. 
References 
Brenan, Geral. 1943. The Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the Social and Political 
Background of the Spanish Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Cabrera, Emilio. 1989. “The medieval Origins of the Great Landed Estates of the 
Guadalquivir Valley”. Economic History Review 42 (4): 465-483. 
Carrión, Pascual. 1975. Los Latifundios en España. Su importancia, Origen. 
Consecuencias y Solución. Barcelona: Ariel. 
Domínguez-Ortiz, Antonio. 1955. La Sociedad Española en el Siglo XVIII. Madrid: 
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto Balmes de Sociología. 
Jovellanos, Gaspar M. de. 1795. Escritos Económicos -Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos. 
Informe sobre la Ley Agraria. Madrid: Real Academia de Ciencias Morales y Políticas, 
D.L. 2000. 
Malefakis, Edward. 1970. Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain. Origins of 
the Civil War. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Olavide, Pablo de. 1768. Informe sobre la Ley Agraria. In La Reforma Agraria en 
Andalucía: el Primer Proyecto Legislativo, edited by Merchán, Antonio. Sevilla: 
Universidad de Sevilla, 1996. 
Pascual, Pere, and Sudriá, Carles. 2002. “El Difícil Arranque de la Industrialización.” In 
Historia económica de España: Siglos X-XX, edited by Comín, Francisco, Mauro 
Hernández y Enrique Llopis, Chapter 6, 203-241. Barcelona: Crítica, D.L. 
Rosés, Joan R., Julio Martínez-Galarraga, and Daniel A. Tirado. 2010. “The upswing of 
regional income inequality in Spain (1860–1930)”. Explorations in Economic History 
47: 244–257. 
36 
 
Appendix Q. A case study of our theory applied to the development paths of Seville 
vs. Barcelona. 
 
The purpose of this Appendix is to show how our theory explains the different 
development paths of a province in Andalusia like Seville, whose Reconquest was fast 
(2194 km2/year), versus Barcelona with a much slower Reconquest rate (158 km2/year). 
For the reasons given above, the repopulation of Barcelona rendered a much more equal 
distribution of land and lordships (as given by a percentage of landless workers of 
55.93% and a percentage of population entities under noble jurisdiction of 51%) versus 
the more unequal distribution in Seville (with a percentage of landless workers of 
85.60% and a percentage of population entities under noble jurisdiction of 73.53%). 
Over time, in large estates regions like Seville, a land tenure system based on short-term 
leases and a policy of oppressing the broad mass of the landless peasantry (which highly 
reduced wages) prevailed. In contrast, in those regions like Barcelona, characterized by 
small and medium-size landholdings owned by free and independent families, a more 
stable form of leasing that could be passed across generations (rabassa morta) 
predominated. In the latter case, there was a much higher incentive to introduce 
improvements in agricultural technology and the benefits of the agrarian activity could 
be shared more equitably between those that owned the land and those that did not. 
Hence, family farms provided financial resources and entrepreneurial training that 
would be highly valuable when the opportunity to industrialize arrived. As pointed out 
by Carreras (1990) and Maluquer de Motes (1984), the higher revenues from the land 
and their more equal distribution created a demand for manufactured goods and led to 
the accumulation of capital, both factors being necessary for the emergence of an 
industrial sector (first the cotton and then the metallurgical industry were leading 
sectors in nineteenth century Barcelona). Thus, an equal distribution of the land and a 
prosperous market-oriented agriculture brought demographic vitality (and an abundant 
labor supply freed from agriculture) and capital accumulation which, combined with a 
flourishing entrepreneurial spirit propelled by a modern bourgeoisie, favored the 
establishment of a modern industrial sector and a regime of balanced growth in 
agriculture, industry and commerce (Tortellá, 2000).  
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In contrast, in large estates provinces like Seville, land was highly concentrated and the 
broad mass of the population was formed by impoverished landless workers who lacked 
the human capital, financial resources and entrepreneurial training obtained from 
previously owning a farm. Under these circumstances, capital did not accumulate and 
the agricultural sector could not provide a strong market for industrial goods (Tortellá, 
2000). If to this we add the fact that the landowning nobility, even at the end of the 
eighteenth century, considered “the practice of working in industry or commerce to 
seem incompatible with the condition with being a noble” (Sarrailh, 1957, p. 890), it is 
not surprising the well-known fact of southern Spain’s failure to industrialize in the 
nineteenth century (Tedde de Lorca, 1985). As a result of this, southern Spain 
specialized in agricultural activities, with very low wages and high profits to the 
landlords. Over the course of the nineteenth century it would fall behind relative to 
other regions like Catalonia and the Basque Country that took advantage of the 
opportunity to industrialize. This accords with the fact that when economic and political 
power is distributed more equitably in society, the resulting economic institutions will 
tend to benefit the majority of the population and will be more appropriate for long-run 
growth (AJR, 2002). 
To conclude, our analysis suggests that the pattern of land distribution can affect the 
transition from an agricultural to an industrial regime. One could also simplify the 
above arguments by pointing out that the transition from small agricultural enterprises 
(family farms) to industrial enterprises is much easier than from a situation of no farm 
(that of landless families) to an industrial enterprise. 
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Appendix R. Channel analysis with two alternative measures of land 
concentration, and on the persistence of land inequality over time 
 
 
Land Gini Index in 1972 Land concentration in 1962
(1) (2)
-0.018*** -0.011***
(0.006) (0.003)
Geo-climatic controls Yes Yes
0.852*** 1.362***
(0.197) (0.307)
F-Statistic 0.35 0.39
Partial R 2 18.7123 19.6105
Geo-climatic controls Yes Yes
R 2 0.71 0.65
Number of observations 45 45
Panel C: OLS regressions of Log GDP pc 2005 on the channel variable
-0.009*** -0.007***
(0.003) (0.002)
Geo-climatic controls Yes Yes
R 2 0.73 0.75
Number of observations 45 45
The channel variable (standardized)
Panel B: First stage (The channel variable regressed on rate of Reconquest)
Rate of Reconquest
The channel variable (standardized)
Notes : Variables descriptions are provided in Table 9. All the estimations include the control set employed in the
baseline specification (column 1, Table 2) and a constant term, which are omitted for space considerations. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. Small-sample correction for standard errors is applied in 2SLS regressions. *, ** and
*** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
TABLE A24 - MECHANISMS AT WORK: LAND INEQUALITY
The channel variable →
Panel A: Second stage (Log GDP pc 2005 regressed on the predicted values of the channel variable)
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Figure A7. The persistence of land inequality over time: the relationship between 
the percentage of landless workers in 1956 and 1797
B) Conditional relationship (after controlling for the set of controls used in column 1, Table 2)
A) Bivariate relationship
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Appendix S. Current income distribution in the Spanish provinces. 
 
13435,000000 - 16202,000000
16202,000001 - 17665,000000
17665,000001 - 19853,000000
19853,000001 - 23334,000000
23334,000001 - 29249,000000
GDP pc in 2005:
13,435 - 16,202 €
16, 03 - 17,665 €
17,666 - 19,853 €
19,854 - 23,334 €
23,335 - 29,249 €
GDP pc in 2005
Figure A8. Current income distribution in the Spanish provinces
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
